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ABSTRACT  
Processes required for the procurement of construction projects by the public and private sectors must 
comply with many requirements and incentives, not least of which is usually the requirement to provide 
value for money. However, large capital works construction projects, particularly those undertaken by 
the public sector, have a tendency to over-run both their construction schedules and their budgets.  This 
is amply demonstrated in South Africa by the construction of the Medupi and Kusile coal fired power 
stations by Eskom, the South African national power utility, which are both running over schedule and 
are projected to be over budget by 52% and 48% respectively. In contrast, Public Private Partnership 
contracts between the private sector and the South African government were recently used to construct 
large, utility scale renewable energy facilities in South Africa, with a total capacity equivalent to that of 
Medupi power station, on time and on budget.  
This research study considers the various procurement options in use globally for the construction of 
capital projects, before looking in detail at the Public Private Partnerships approach for infrastructure 
procurement, both globally and in the South African context for energy projects. The research study and 
aims to answer the questions, “What are the key factors that influence the outcome of energy projects 
procured using public private partnerships in South Africa?” and “What interventions could improve the 
success rates of projects procured using public private partnership contracts in South Africa?”. 
A social constructionist epistemology was adopted to guide the research, as the context of the research 
questions is complex requiring flexible research approaches, able to consider matters such as the 
perceptions of stakeholders involved in energy projects.   
 The research study makes use of a systematic literature review of international publications, and a survey 
of individuals working in the South African renewable energy industry. The data was analysed using 
qualitative content analysis to identify themes, and further coded to identify the factors. The research 
study aims to contribute to the body of knowledge on the use of the effectiveness of the Public Private 
Partnerships approach used for the procurement of energy projects in South Africa as there appears to 
have been little research undertaken in this area to date. 
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The systematic literature results found that there are eight critical success factors which are essential to 
the successful development of projects using the public private partnerships contracting approach 
internationally. The assessment of the survey results identified an additional critical success factor, 
Economic Development, that is of particular relevance to the success of projects in South Africa using 
the public private partnerships contracting approach. Contributing to economic development, in 
developing countries such as South Africa, is key to getting the necessary political support required for 
public private partnership projects to succeed. 
The research study also shows that while these critical success factor areas were adhered to when the 
South African renewable energy programmes were established, work is required in some key areas, 
including the factors of political certainty and programme consistency, if the programmes are to continue 
to be successful.  
An interrelationship diagraph and a causal loop diagram were developed in order to understand how the 
critical success factors that were identified interact and where possible interventions might be best 
located in order to improve the performance of PPP projects in South Africa.  Through developing an 
understanding of the resulting behaviours of the critical success factors, four possible interventions were 
identified, which if implemented could strengthen the critical success factors which are failing and 
therefore increase the level of economic development of the country, which was identified as the key 
outcome of the analysis. The interventions identified are: 
• Review of the barriers and opportunities to reduce the cost of finance of PPP projects in South 
Africa and hence improve the critical success factor, “Suitable Financial Conditions”. 
• Undertake a root cause analysis to understand the reasons for lack of commitment for the 
critical success factor, “Commitment of Public & Private Parties”. 
• Undertake regular reviews to ensure PPP framework remains favourable to both public and 
private parties and hence improve the “Favourable PPP Framework” critical success factor. 
• Review barriers and opportunities to increase local content of projects. 
Opportunities exist to expand this research through further study and increasing the number of survey 
responses as well as broadening the pool of industry professionals that respond. The answer to this 
research question would also benefit from undertaking an assessment of the level of maturity of the 
critical success factors identified for the South African renewable energy PPP programmes, which would 
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provide further details of the aspects of the critical success factors that are being successfully met and 
those that require further work.  
The learnings from this research study could be of benefit to the body of knowledge surrounding the 
development and execution of PPP energy projects in South Africa and other developing countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PURCHASING AND PROCUREMENT IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS 
Purchasing and procurement are essential tasks undertaken by both the private sector and the public 
sector for the provision of a wide range of goods and services, from the purchasing of goods, such as 
stationery, to the procurement or development of capital projects, such as for the provision of 
infrastructure. However, how this procurement is undertaken and the incentives behind it vary 
considerably between the private and public sectors. In the private sector, goods and services are 
generally procured on the basis of least cost for a given level of quality (Walker & Brammer, 2009); 
however, how these goods and services are procured in the private sector varies from company to 
company. Webster (1992) observes that the increasing need for organisational flexibility in order to be 
able to respond quickly to changes in technology, competition and client requirements has resulted in 
private sector businesses having a wide range of relationship structures between consumers and suppliers. 
These structures range from businesses at one end of the spectrum that procure all purchases by tendering, 
to those that have repeated transactions with particular suppliers, to partnerships involving negotiations, 
to at the other end of the spectrum, strategic alliances being formed between businesses.  Strategic 
alliances are defined by Webster in this context as “the formation of a new entity such as a product 
development team, a research project, or a manufacturing facility, to which both parties commit resources 
and which serves clear strategic purposes for both” (Webster, 1992:5). 
The objectives of public sector procurement processes are usually much broader than just aiming for 
procurement on the basis of least cost and provision of value. In addition to these two factors, they often 
include social and environmental objectives as well as political objectives, as noted by National Treasury 
(2015a) and Arlbjorn and Freytag (2012). That is not to say that private sector business does not include 
social objectives in their procurement processes; however, for the private sector this is a choice, rather 
than an obligation (Walker & Brammer, 2009).  An example of the differences in focus between 
procurement considerations in the private and public sectors is given by  Arlbjorn and Freytag 
(2012:204), “Within the public sector one seeks to include as many vendors as possible in order to 
increase competition, whereas the private industry seeks to minimise this number in order to reduce 
risks”.  
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Public procurement is also governed by particular sets of rules including the need for transparency, the 
provision of value for money and the use of good governance processes. In South Africa, the procurement 
regulations require that good governance is used in the supply chain management process as “good 
governance ensures transparency, accountability, efficiency and upholding of the rule of law in 
economic, political and administrative processes” (National Treasury, 2015a:15). Similarly, in the UK, 
“Public Procurement is guided by the principles of transparency, accountability and achieving value for 
money for citizens and tax payers” (Walker & Brammer, 2009:128).  
In South Africa, the inefficiencies of public procurement are well documented. In an effort to improve 
the procurement processes of the public sector in South Africa, in 2015 the National Treasury 
commissioned a review of the public sector supply chain, the 2015 Public Sector Supply Chain 
Management Review (National Treasury, 2015a:1). The opening paragraphs in the foreword of this 
document state the following: 
Supply chain management (SCM) is one of the key mechanisms enabling government to implement 
policy. Traditionally SCM has been misunderstood and undervalued. Its strategic importance has not been 
recognised, and it has been under-capacitated. 
The negative effects of inefficient public sector SCM, particularly in the procurement phase of the chain, 
are well documented. Suppliers charge excessive prices: goods and services contracted for and delivered 
are of poor quality and unreliable; and there is corruption and waste. 
The private sector, by contrast, has tended to invest astutely in SCM to maximise shareholder value and 
ensure that its products and services match clients’ needs. 
Achieving good supply chain management is therefore essential in order to achieve value for money in 
procurement, whether in the private or public sectors. Mentzer et al. (2001:3) observe that “a supply 
chain consists of multiple firms, both upstream (i.e. supply) and downstream (i.e. distribution), and the 
ultimate consumer.”  Mentzer et al. (2001:15) go on to define supply chain management as a philosophy, 
the implementation of which, “enhances customer value and satisfaction, which in turn leads to enhanced 
competitive advantage for the supply chain as well as each member firm. This, ultimately, improves the 
profitability of the supply chain and its members.” Focussed good management of the full supply chain 
is reported by Lummus and Vokurka (1999) as first taking place in the textile industry in the USA in the 
mid-1980s. By the mid-1990s the approach had spread to the supermarket and computing businesses 
(Lummus & Vokurka, 1999); however by the early 2000s it was still yet to be used by the public sector 
in the USA (Korosec, 2003). As is stated above, in South Africa, investment in supply chain management 
in the public sector was still to take place as recently as 2015. 
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Considering the procurement processes, the procurement of goods and services is usually undertaken in 
a staged process, which varies according to needs but generally has the same basic components. Tadelis 
(2012) summarises the procurement process as a four stage process. First of all, the buyer has to decide 
exactly what is to be procured and how to advertise this need to potential suppliers.  Second, a contract 
must be specified that details all the contractual obligations of the buyer and the supplier as well as the 
means of compensation. Third, a means of awarding the contract must be selected and last of all a cost 
effective means of allowing changes to be made to the product being supplied, whether defined by the 
purchaser or the supplier must be in place. In a not dissimilar vein National Treasury (2015a) states that 
in South Africa the public procurement process has three main steps; pre-tender, tender and post tender. 
The pre-tender stage is noted as being the most critical stage in the procurement process and includes 
“needs assessment, planning and budgeting, development of specifications, and selection of the most 
suitable procurement strategy.”  
It can be seen from the above that the business of purchasing and procurement in both the private and 
public sectors is complex and requires proper resourcing and training if it is to meet the requirements of 
the relevant stakeholders. 
1.2 INFRASTRUCTURE PROCUREMENT 
Public sector procurement, as mentioned above, is a very broad subject area. This research study focusses 
on one sector of public procurement, the procurement of infrastructure projects, and in particular those 
projects in the South African power sector. However, as a start, the meaning of infrastructure must first 
be clarified. Grimsey and Lewis (2000) note that infrastructure is difficult to define but go on to observe 
that infrastructure is used to provide basic services to communities and industries and is essential for 
economic activity. Infrastructure includes energy systems (generation and supply), transport systems, 
fresh water provision and waste water removal and treatment, communication systems and social 
infrastructure such as hospitals, prisons, courts, museums and schools. 
The need for good supply chain management in infrastructure provision is demonstrated by the fact that 
large capital works construction projects, particularly infrastructure projects undertaken by the public 
sector, have a tendency to over-run both their construction schedules and their budgets.  KPMG estimates 
that globally 90% of public sector infrastructure projects are completed late and over the budget (KPMG, 
2015). 
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This tendency of large capital works construction projects to over-run their construction schedules and 
budgets is amply demonstrated in South Africa by the construction of the Medupi and Kusile coal fired 
power stations by Eskom, the South African national power utility. These projects were originally 
projected to have project costs of R69 billion and R80 billion respectively (Steyn, 2015). However, these 
two power plants are now projected to have total project costs of R105 billion and R118.5 billion 
(National Treasury, 2015b), which are increases of 52% and 48% respectively. The construction of both 
power stations are also running late, although how late is difficult to confirm as projected completion 
dates for these facilities are not readily available. The first of Medupi’s six units was originally scheduled 
to commence power generation in 2012 (Patel, 2013); however, this unit eventually only started 
generating power in 2015 (Eskom, 2016).  
To put the severity of the above cost over-runs into context, the South African government estimated 
revenue for 2016/17 is R1,331.5 billion, of which infrastructure investment is planned to be R813.1 
billion over three years (National Treasury, 2015), or an average of R271 billion per year. Given that 
Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, Molin, and van Wee (2010) estimate that globally large infrastructure projects cost, 
on average, 28% more than planned, if this figure, which is almost half of the cost over-runs of the 
Medupi and Kusile projects, is used as the average level of cost over-run, then this equates to R76 billion 
of wasted expenditure by the South African government (National Treasury, 2004c). 
This problem of cost over-runs and late delivery of infrastructure projects has also been identified by 
Consulting Engineers South Africa (CESA). They have noted on their website that there are many 
inefficiencies in the engineering supply chain management system including, “inappropriate approaches 
for procuring consulting engineering services, lack of technical project management capacity and 
capability in the public sector (resulting in poor planning and poor management of implementation of 
infrastructure projects), lack of other desired technical skills in the public sector (impacting negatively 
on maintenance of existing infrastructure) and rampant corruption”  (CESA, 2015). The above 
statements, as well as the infrastructure procurement track record of South African public sector as 
evident in the Kusile and Medupi projects, clearly indicate that the conventional means of procuring 
infrastructure projects by the South African public sector are not working.   
To meet the shortcomings identified above by CESA (2015), would require significant investment in 
training and capacity building if conventional means of procurement are to continue to be used by the 
public sector. To meet some of these shortcomings, the South African government has started to utilise 
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Public Private Partnership (PPP) contracts for the procurement of roads infrastructure, prisons and water 
infrastructure and more recently for power generation infrastructure (National Treasury PPP Unit, n.d.). 
Public Private Partnership contracts are defined by Broadbent and Laughlin (2003:334) as “an approach 
to delivering public services that involves the private sector, but one that provides for a more direct 
control relationship between the private and public sector that would be achieved by a simple (legally-
protected) market-based and arms-length purchase.” Public Private Partnership contracts are considered 
in more detail in Chapter 2. 
Considering the power generation sector of the construction industry, Public Private Partnership contracts 
between the private sector and the South African government, were recently used to construct large, 
utility-scale renewable energy facilities in South Africa, with a total capacity equivalent to that of Medupi 
power station, on time and on budget, as indicated by Engineering News (2015).  While this example 
may indicate that PPP contracts are a more effective way to procure energy projects, with the exception 
of articles, such as Eberhard et al (2014) and Eberhard and Kaberger (2016), there appears to have been 
little research into how successful this means of procurement has been in South Africa for the 
procurement of energy infrastructure projects. This may be due to the relatively recent use of the PPP 
model to develop energy projects in South Africa compared to the use of conventional procurement 
methods used to develop energy projects such as the Medupi and Kusile power stations.  
1.3 THE FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH 
This chapter has highlighted that procurement, whether via the private or public sectors is a complex 
matter. As indicated above, despite the importance of infrastructure to national economies, the South 
African public sector has historically not invested in supply chain management in comparison with the 
efforts of the private sector.  To meet some of these shortcomings the South African government has 
started to use the PPP contracting approach for certain types of infrastructure, including energy 
generation. However, there has been little research into how successful the PPP contracting approach has 
been in South Africa and what actions could be taken to improve the PPP contracting approach. 
This research study is intended to contribute to the body of knowledge on energy project procurement 
and considers how energy infrastructure projects are procured in South Africa using Public Private 
Partnership contracts in comparison with international best practice use of PPP procurement practices. 
Where areas of South African PPP procurement practice are identified as needing improvement these 
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will be highlighted and possible actions indicated. This research attempts to answer the research 
questions: 
• RQ1: What are the key factors that influence the outcome of energy projects procured using 
public private partnership contracts in South Africa? 
• RQ2: What interventions could improve the success rates of projects procured using public 
private partnership contracts in South Africa? 
Answering the research questions requires the generation of principles and theories rather than the testing 
of any principles or theories, which is an inductive approach. The nature of the questions requires the use 
of an epistemological approach which allows the many diverse perspectives present in the procurement 
of PPP projects to be considered. The diverse perspectives of procurement also mean that much of the 
data available for this research is not easily defined and must be extracted from a range of sources. 
Considering these requirements, a qualitative approach was selected for the research and a social 
constructionist epistemology was adopted. A contents analysis methodology was utilised to gather and 
then analyse the associated data. 
1.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is presented in six chapters which are summarised below: 
• Chapter 1 (Introduction) introduces the research topic. It provides the background to the research 
and states the research objectives and the question to be answered. 
• Chapter 2 (Literature Review) presents a review of the literature related to the procurement of 
infrastructure, including energy projects, globally and in South Africa, to give context to the 
research question. It commences with a review of the different definitions of procurement before 
considering different views on how infrastructure projects are procured internationally and in 
South Africa. The use of public private partnerships as a contracting model internationally is then 
reviewed before narrowing down to a review of the use of PPPs as a model for the procurement 
of power generation facilities. 
• Chapter 3 (Methodology and Methods) commences with a discussion of the philosophy 
underpinning management research before considering the methodologies appropriate for the 
research study to be undertaken and then finally explaining the methods used for the research 
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undertaken. The chapter concludes with a section that outlines the importance of trustworthiness 
and ethics and the application of these concepts in this research study. 
• In Chapter 4 (Results) the results of the systematic literature review and the survey are presented. 
The chapter includes explanations of how the critical success factors associated with international 
projects compare with those associated with South African projects and how these factors are 
related.  
• Chapter 5 (Discussion) presents a discussion of the findings and proposed interventions.  The 
chapter concludes with a summary of how this research could be developed further. 
• Chapter 6 (Conclusions and Recommendations) is the final chapter and brings together the key 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a review of the available literature on the procurement of infrastructure, including 
energy projects. As infrastructure is generally procured by the public sector, the literature review 
concentrates on procurement in the public sector. Tranfield, Denyer, and Palminder (2003) note that the 
literature review process is a key tool to enable the researcher to map out the available literature and to 
define the research question, or questions, in a manner that will develop the body of knowledge further.  
The literature review commences by firstly considering the definitions of procurement, this is followed 
by the review of literature on infrastructure procurement globally, before narrowing down to the available 
literature on infrastructure procurement in South Africa. A high level commentary on the effectiveness 
of the different types of procurement is included. The chapter then considers one particular procurement 
route, the use of Public Private Partnerships.  The history of the use of the Public Private Partnership 
contracts for the procurement of infrastructure projects is considered as well as the strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach. 
2.2 DEFINITIONS OF PROCUREMENT  
 For the purposes of this study, it is useful to understand what is meant by the term “procurement”. 
Further to the introduction to the topic of procurement in Chapter 1, procurement is defined by the 
Cambridge Dictionary as the “process of getting supplies” (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). However, when 
referring to activities in industry, procurement is quoted by Jefferies and Rowlinson (2016:2) as “the 
tendering and selection systems required to obtain anything from paperclips to power stations,” and in 
particular with relation to capital projects, procurement is defined by Jefferies and Rowlinson (2016:2) 
as “the organisational structure adopted by the client for the management of the design and construction 
of a building project.”  Lloyd and McCue (2004) take these definitions further and show that the processes 
of procurement by governments, or other public bodies vary significantly from country to country and 
indeed between provinces or states within countries. They go on to note that public procurement 
processes usually include the following: procurement planning; publishing of upcoming tenders; 
preparing and issuing tenders; evaluating bids, proposals and quotations; conducting the assessment of 
bids, proposals and quotations; assessing contractor capabilities; awarding contracts; monitoring 
contractor performance; modifying contracts; extending or terminating contracts; closing out completed 
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contracts; evaluating contractor past performance. These aspects are in accordance with the summary of 
the procurement process provided by Tadelis (2012), which, as noted in Chapter 1, is a four stage process. 
First of all, the buyer has to decide exactly what is to be procured and how to advertise this need to 
potential suppliers.  Second, a contract must be specified that details all the contractual obligations of the 
buyer and the supplier as well as the means of compensation. Third, a means of awarding the contract 
must be selected and finally, a cost effective means of allowing changes to be made to the product being 
supplied, whether defined by the purchaser or the supplier must be in place. 
2.3 PROCUREMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS GLOBALLY 
There are many different methodologies used to procure infrastructure by government bodies. The 
following sections discuss the literature available on different aspects of the procurement and 
development of infrastructure projects, with viewpoints provided from a number of different countries, 
such as the USA, the UK, Korea, Zambia, Nigeria, as well as the countries which make up the European 
Union. As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, public sector procurement is governed by rules and 
regulations pertinent to the country where the procurement takes place.  
The procurement of infrastructure projects involves many competing factors, such as the client, 
stakeholders, finance, politics, national and organisational cultures, to name but a few. An indication of 
the number of these factors involved in the procurement of infrastructure projects and the relationships 
between them is demonstrated by (Rowlinson, 1999) in Figure 1. The effectiveness of the procurement 
processes used, are dependent on all of these factors successfully interacting, although some will have 
more influence than others. Rowlinson (1999:29) notes that “Elements, such as contract strategy and the 
client are functional parts of the procurement system. However, the effectiveness of the client 
organisation or the contract strategy is modified by other procurement variables such as culture, 
sustainability, economic and political environment and more practical concepts such as partnering.” Of 
the factors identified, which influence the procurement of construction projects, Rowlinson (1999) goes 
on to discuss the project client and the contracting strategies factors in more detail.   
Research has also been undertaken on other factors affecting procurement processes. Green and Lenard 
(1999) consider various means by which the project procurement process can be organised, while 
Murray, Langford, Hardcastle, and Tookey (1999) consider the different ways in which the temporary 
organisations, which are often created to enable the procurement of large infrastructure projects, can be 
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set up. Another factor which influences infrastructure procurement is culture, which is considered by Liu 
and Fellows (1999). Culture is not only an environmental variable, external to the project and whose 
level of influence is dependent on the porousness of the project boundary, but is also present within the 
project as “cultures are embodied in all people and therefore are present within the system and in the 
environment” (Liu & Fellows, 1999:142).  
 
FIGURE 1: A SYSTEMS VIEW OF PROCUREMENT (ROWLINSON, 1999:28) 
Due to the many different factors involved in the procurement of construction projects there are a plethora 
of procurement approaches used; however no international definition or classification system exists 
(McDermott, 1999).  McDermott (1999) goes on to note that in the UK the National Economic 
Development Office has listed five main procurement routes which are traditional; design and build; 
design and manage; management contracting and construction management, although a definition of 
what these routes are or how they vary is not provided.   However, Rowlinson (1999) does provide 
guidance as to what four of these different approaches are, which are summarised below.  
• Traditional Approach – The key characteristic of this approach is the separation of the design 
and construction processes. The design is undertaken by a consultant and the construction is 
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undertaken by a contractor independent of the consultant. The design and construction processes 
are sequential and independent of each other. 
• Design and Build Approach – In this approach the client appoints a single party to undertake 
both the design and the construction phases of work and there is the opportunity to overlap the 
design and construction phases. 
• Management Contracting - In this approach instead of the client managing the contractors and 
consultants as in the Traditional Approach and the Design and Build Approach, the trades 
contractors contract with the managing contractor as opposed to with the client. 
• Construction Management – This approach is similar to management contracting; however, the 
trades contractors contract with the client, not the construction manager. 
The advantages and disadvantages of each approach as well as some background to each approach are 
also provided by Rowlinson (1999).  
Where services, which were previously provided by the public sector, are to be provided by the private 
sector via competitive tender, additional costs must be considered. “Competitive tendering may impose 
new burdens on public services, for example transaction costs, trust costs and rent-seeking costs” (Boyne, 
1998:710). Boyne (1998) goes on to note that in the UK, at the date of writing, there was limited evidence 
regarding the benefits or not of competitive tendering. Estache and Iimi (2008) note that where there is 
limited funding available to deliver infrastructure projects such as in the developing world, including 
countries in Africa, this funding must be very carefully spent and areas for improving cost effectiveness 
must be considered. The research considers the importance of ensuring competition in achieving cost 
efficiencies in procuring infrastructure projects such as electricity, roads and water infrastructure projects 
and argues that for competition to be effective, “in road and water projects at least seven firms are 
required for an auction to be competitive enough. The required level of competition for electricity 
projects may be much lower, perhaps at three, but this is less conclusive” (Estache & Iimi, 2008:38). 
This research does not consider the different contractual models used for procurement of infrastructure 
and their impact on the project costs, nor the additional costs required to administer the tender process 
and resulting contracts.  
On the subject of tender process design, Bergman and Lundberg (2013) consider the various supplier 
selection methods used for public procurement in the EU and the USA and make recommendations for 
when the different methods should be used.  Bergman and Lundberg note that the EU procurement 
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directives stipulate that tenders must be awarded to either the lowest bidder or the applicant that submits 
the most economically advantageous tender. Bergman and Lundberg also propose that the use of the 
most economically advantageous tender become mandatory, although it adds complexity to the supplier 
selection process. How this added level of complexity could be managed, while maintaining the 
requirements of transparency and avoidance of subjectivity in tender adjudication, is not considered. 
Falagario, Sciancalepore, Costantino, and Pietroforte (2012) address this concern of how to adjudicate 
tenders based on the most economically advantageous tender approach transparently and avoiding 
subjectivity. They propose an approach that will enable the bidders to be ranked without the need for 
subjective assessments and thereby improving the governance of such tender processes. The proposed 
approach was validated through the use of a case study concerning the refurbishment of the Polytechnic 
of Bari in Italy. How much training will be required by tender adjudicators to use this approach and what 
additional costs will be accrued as a result, was not considered. 
Related to public sector supplier selection, Lorentziadis (2010) notes that conventional competitive, 
sealed bidding does not permit any recognition to be provided where enhanced characteristics may be 
offered at a slightly higher price, but provide better overall value.  Lorentziadis notes that using bid 
assessment criteria based on the most economically advantageous tender allows a combination of non-
price and price based factors to be used; however, as with Bergman and Lundberg (2013), consideration 
of how good governance can be maintained in the adjudication of such tenders is not considered. The 
locations that this research would apply to are not provided.    
The use of the different contract forms has also varied over time. Oyegoke, Dickinson, Khalfan, 
McDermott, and Rowlinson (2009) note that in the UK as an example, reviewing survey results from 
1985 to 2004, the use of design and build contracts, which includes Public Private Partnership contracts, 
steadily increased from 3.5% to 13.3%, while the use of the traditional contracting approach reduced 
from 92.6% to 76.7%, although it is still the preferred contracting approach for the majority of 
construction works undertaken. A detailed review of these different contract forms is provided; however, 
the reasons for the changes in popularity of the different contract forms are not presented. 
International publications available on the subject of infrastructure procurement inefficiencies include 
the UK government publication, Infrastructure Procurement Route Map – a guide to improving delivery 
capability (HM Treasury, 2013), and the Western Australian Government publication, Infrastructure 
Procurement Options Guide (Government of Western Australia, 2010). HM Treasury (2013) provides a 
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guide to the processes and decisions which must take place to successfully procure infrastructure projects. 
The document highlights the importance of selecting the correct procurement strategy for a particular 
project and ensuring that the project procurement team has the correct skills.  As would be expected, this 
publication notes that many projects will have a number of different possible procurement options.  
Which one is most suitable will depend on a number of factors, including the risk appetite of the project 
sponsor and the project specific details. A number of contractual procurement approaches are listed, 
ranging from the traditional approaches listed above to less conventional approaches such as the use of 
public private partnerships, known in the UK as Private Finance Initiatives. The Infrastructure 
Procurement Route Map highlights that to improve the efficiency of infrastructure procurement a lean 
procurement initiative has been set-up and training has been provided to senior project leaders working 
in UK public procurement. This is a good example of the type of investment required in public 
procurement supply chains in South Africa, highlighted by National Treasury (2015a). The need for the 
client body in charge of the procurement process to be adequately skilled is further emphasised, “Client 
capability is critical to achieving success in procurement particularly when using more sophisticated 
procurement models. Choosing a procurement strategy with little or no understanding of capability 
requirements will rarely result in an efficient outcome” (HM Treasury, 2013:5).   
In addition to the need for public body clients or project sponsors to have appropriate understanding of 
the procurement processes, HM Treasury (2013) indicates that other key areas which are essential for 
successful infrastructure delivery are collaborative working; appropriate risk allocation; incentivisation 
of the supply chain at the 1st and 2nd tier levels; and supply chain performance management. 
The Infrastructure Procurement Options Guide is intended to help improve understanding of a range of 
infrastructure procurement models, assist public sector executives and managers with making decisions 
relating to infrastructure asset investment and provide guidance on Western Australia government asset 
management policies (Government of Western Australia, 2010). Like the Infrastructure Procurement 
Route Map, the Infrastructure Procurement Options Guide emphasises the need for client bodies and 
other project parties to be adequately skilled.  It does not lay out a detailed map of the processes to be 
followed during the project procurement, but does provide a detailed list of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various procurement contracting approaches as well as indicating whether the client 
or contractor makes the key decisions or whether this responsibility is shared. These two documents are 
therefore complementary to each other.  
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2.4 INFRASTRUCTURE PROCUREMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
A limited amount of research has been undertaken on the effectiveness of infrastructure procurement in 
South Africa. Watermeyer has published a number of conference papers on procurement in South Africa, 
including Delivering Infrastructure at Scale in Developing Countries: Numbers or Systems (Watermeyer 
& Thumbiran, 2009) and Changing the Construction Procurement Culture to Improve Project Outcomes 
(Watermeyer, n.d.). These papers discuss the process of construction procurement and recommendations 
are made on how improvements could be made through moving from a combative type approach using 
traditional, design and build or management contracting to a partnering or collaborative type of approach 
between project parties. Suggestions on how this could be achieved or what would be required to enable 
this change are not, however, provided.  
Ramabodu and Verster (2010) and Monyane (2013) consider various aspects of project delivery 
inefficiencies in their research. Ramabodu and Verster (2010) consider the problem of cost over-runs in 
infrastructure projects in South Africa and through the use of surveys of construction professionals, 
arrives at various factors that contribute to cost over-runs. However, this article is limited in its detail as 
it only considers the construction stage of the project and not the procurement and planning stages that 
precede construction.  Monyane (2013) reports on a similar investigation considering public sector works 
in the Free State province in particular and concludes that the major causes of cost over-runs on public 
sector projects in the Free State province are additional works requested by clients, inadequate planning 
and low bidding by contractors. The reasons for inadequate planning and why contractors might be 
underbidding were not investigated. Neither Ramabodu and Verster (2010) nor Monyane (2013) tested 
the appropriateness of the contract structures used.  
2.5 THE PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP) PROCUREMENT MODEL FOR INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECTS 
Of the many procurement models available, the PPP model has, over the last 30 years, grown in 
popularity as a means for governments to continue to provide the infrastructure necessary to ensure 
economic growth in times when available public finance is limited (Jefferies & Rowlinson, 2016). 
Indeed, Jefferies notes that the model was used in the 1700’s and 1800’s for projects such as the Suez 
Canal, where governments did not fund such infrastructure and left the provision of it to the private 
sector. From the end of the 19th century, governments used their own financial resources for the 
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development of new infrastructure; however, from the 1970’s a combination of factors such as the need 
for infrastructure development to keep pace with levels of population growth and changes in population 
demographics resulted in the PPP contracting model resurfacing (Jefferies & Rowlinson, 2016). Burger 
and Hawkesworth (2011) notes that from 2000 to 2010, 12% of the UK government capital expenditure 
was spent on PPP projects. However, while the PPP contracting model has been in use in Europe since 
the early 80s, arrangements for its use in South Africa have only been in place since 1997 with a dedicated 
PPP unit created within the South African National Treasury from 2000 (National Treasury, n.d.).  
Many articles and publications are available on the subject of PPP contracting, whether for buildings or 
for infrastructure development and, generally, for projects located outside South Africa. There are also a 
number of articles on the use of PPP processes for the procurement of large infrastructure projects in 
various countries, although not for South African projects. However, the South African National 
Treasury has made publicly available a detailed manual on public sector guidance and requirements for 
PPP projects (National Treasury, 2004a).   This manual consists of nine parts, South African Regulations 
for PPPs; Code of Good Practice for BEE in PPPs; PPP Inceptions; PPP Feasibility Study; PPP 
Procurement; Managing the PPP Agreement; Auditing PPPs; Accounting Treatment for PPPs and An 
Introduction to Project Finance.  
A key reason for using the PPP contract model to deliver infrastructure projects is that it transfers certain 
risks and risk mitigations away from the public sector, to the private sector.  The level of success, in this 
regard, of PPP energy projects in the South African context will be considered in this research.  Many 
papers and articles have been written on risks in PPP projects internationally and include Grimsey and 
Lewis (2000) and  Bing et al. (2005) on projects in the UK, Ameyaw and Chan (2013) on projects in 
Ghana and Jefferies and Rowlinson (2016) who considers the state of PPP risk management in the UK, 
Germany, Switzerland and Australia.  
Grimsey and Lewis (2000) draw on the experience of undertaking risk assessments for PPP projects in 
the UK and propose a framework for assessing risks from the perspectives of the procuring body, the 
project sponsors and the senior lenders on the project. Grimsey and Lewis (2000) indicate that there are 
at least nine key risk areas that must be considered, which are technical risk; construction risk; operating 
risk; revenue risk; financial risks; force majeure risk; regulatory / political risks; environmental risks; 
and project default. Methodologies for assessing how these different risks can be shared between the 
project sponsors, the procuring body and the lenders are not considered. However, this aspect of risk 
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management on PPP projects is considered by Li, Akintoye, Edwards, and Hardcastle (2005b) and by 
Jefferies and Rowlinson (2016), which are discussed below. 
Which party becomes responsible for managing the different risks on a PPP project is a matter for careful 
negotiation between the project parties and as Jefferies and Rowlinson (2016) notes, the party that 
negotiates away a particular risk will pay a price.  Based on the results of a survey of individuals involved 
in PPP projects in the UK, Li et al. (2005b) have developed a risk allocation matrix, which is shown in 
Figure 2.  They summarise that in “in order to achieve value for money objectives in public project and 
service delivery development, the public and private sector partners need to reach a mutually acceptable 
risk allocation scheme before the contract is awarded” (Li et al, 2005b:34).  Details of how the risks are 
allocated between the parties and which party is best placed to manage each risk, are not provided.  
Based on a review of 16 PPP projects in China, Ke, Wang, Chan, and Lam (2010) developed a list of 
seven risk factors which could cause PPP project failures, namely political, construction, operation, legal, 
market, economic and other, which is broken down further as force majeure, residual risk and weather. 
These are generally similar to those risks proposed by Grimsey and Lewis (2000), despite being for PPP 
projects undertaken under different cultural settings. Based on analysis of survey results where 
respondents with PPP practitioner or academic experience were asked to indicate how each risk should 
be allocated, Ke et al. (2010) developed a numerical methodology to determine which party should be 
allocated each risk. Jefferies and Rowlinson (2016) note that other methods used to solve the risk 
allocation problem include Monte Carlo Simulations, real options theory, artificial neuronal networks, 
fuzzy logic, stochastic processes and game theory. 
Ameyaw and Chan (2013) through a review of six PPP water supply case studies in Ghana identify 40 
different risk factors, which are grouped into the following eight categories: political and regulatory risks; 
operational risks; market / revenue risks; financial risks; relationship risks; project and private consortium 
selection; social risks; and third party risks, which are again very similar to those risks highlighted in 
other publications for projects in the UK and China. The details of these risk areas are discussed in the 
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FIGURE 2: RISK ALLOCATION PROCESS IN PPP CONTRACT PROCUREMENT (LI ET AL., 2005B:27) 
Many of the risk areas identified in the PPP literature are areas associated with project governance. To 
assist with remedying this problem, the United Nations has published a Guidebook on Promoting Good 
Governance in Public-Private Partnerships (United Nations, 2008). This publication includes case studies 
of successful PPP projects in Canada, France, Israel, Tajikistan and the USA. 
A few publications are available which consider the track record of the PPP contractual approach. 
Spackman (2002) discusses lessons learned from the implementation of PPP projects in the UK and notes 
that the use of PPP projects in the place of public sector procurement has resulted in better defined 
contracts, improved contract management as well as design innovations.  However, they have also 
resulted in increased tendering and setup costs, although the balance between the benefits and these 
increased costs are not currently known. Farlam (2005) considers the lessons learned from PPP projects 
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in Africa through the use of eight case studies covering a range of infrastructure procurement in South 
Africa, Mozambique, Uganda, Gabon and Tanzania. The publication notes that the PPP model should 
bring the benefits of private sector expertise and finance to develop projects; however, it is also observed 
that these projects do not always deliver on these promises.  Farlam (2005:ii) concludes in his executive 
summary that “This review of PPPs suggests that, above all, governments must fundamentally improve 
their systems for dealing with the private sector to realise the efficiency and effectiveness gains that these 
partnerships promise.” The publication includes a list of 19 recommendations to improve the 
performance of PPP projects in Africa. 
A concern when considering appropriate procurement models for sustainable infrastructure is whether 
the PPP model is appropriate. Koppenjan and Enserink (2009) note that the use of PPP contracts may not 
align with the need of societies to develop sustainable infrastructure, due to the private sector often 
having a focus on short term financial returns.  In this article Koppenjan and Enserink (2009) identifies 
that the three key areas of governance which governments must pay attention to if their PPPs are to be 
both successful in terms of sustainability and value for money, are prevention of regulatory capture 
through ensuring sufficient regulatory capacity and expertise, prevention of regulatory rent seeking 
through ensuring transparency and accountability and making sustainability a part of the regulator’s 
agenda through the use of targets and an appropriate incentive structure. These are all aspects of good 
governance, which must be put in place for all PPP projects to be successful as supported by the United 
Nations (2008).  
A number of articles consider the cost aspects and value for money presented by the PPP contract 
approach. Hoppe, Kusterera, and Schmitza (2013) finds that PPP structures incentivise cost reduction 
investments, compared to conventional contracting, although these cost reduction investments can either 
increase or decrease service quality. This is supported by Robinson and Scott (2009:195), who state that 
“Subjectivity in the output specification has a significant impact on the scope of service delivery and 
level of compliance.” Robinson and Scott (2009:195) go on to say that to ensure that service quality is 
maximised, “Long term relationships between private sector service providers and public sector clients 
in PFI projects can provide a powerful stimulus to facilitate learning, knowledge sharing innovation and 
continuous improvement in service delivery.”  
Grimsey and Lewis (2005) consider whether PPP procurement provides good value for money and 
review the value for money assessment approaches used in over twenty countries.  In many of these 
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countries a calculation is used, known as the Public Sector Comparator. However, the outcome is highly 
dependent on the assumptions used and as such it is recommended that the PSC is just one part of the 
value for money assessment and that other aspects, such as the transfer of risk from the public sector to 
the private sector should be considered.  Grimsey and Lewis (2005) conclude by noting that while PPPs 
are not necessarily suitable for small projects, due to the large setup costs, nor to projects where the scope 
cannot be defined in detail due to flexibility requirements, prior to the introduction of PPP contracting, 
75% of large infrastructure projects in the UK were late and over budget, while 75% of projects delivered 
using PPP contracting are delivered on time and to budget.  UK Treasury guidance in 2008 for the 
threshold for a cost effective PPP project is a project capital cost of £20 million (Burger & Hawkesworth, 
2011).  Projects below this size can be developed using PPP contracting provided they can be bundled 
together into a single project (McCormack, n.d.), which is supported by the researcher’s own experience 
of working in the South African PPP sector, where the approach of bundling small projects together to 
enable the use of project finance is also used. 
The aspects of PPP contracting that are essential for such projects to be successful, known as critical 
success factors, have been widely discussed and vary according to location and to a certain extent project 
type.  Some examples of this discussion are: Li, Akintoye, Edwards, and Hardcastle (2004), Jacobson 
and Sang (2008) and Cheung et al. (2012a).  The concept of a critical success factor was first used by 
Rockart (1982:4) who defines critical success factors as “those few key areas of activity in which 
favourable results are absolutely necessary for a manager to reach his/her goals”. When considering 
construction projects, a critical success factor is defined by Li et al. (2004) as those key areas where 
absolute success is necessary for a project to succeed. In other words, a failure in any one of the areas 
identified as a critical success factor area, could result in the project failing. Eighteen critical success 
factors were tested by Li et al. (2004), for projects in the UK, through survey responses from a mix of 
public and private sector bodies. These were then found to fall into five categories, effective procurement, 
project implementability, government guarantee, favourable economic conditions and available financial 
market. 
Jacobson and Sang (2008) notes that for projects in the USA there are ten success factors, which are: a 
unifying specific vision shared between PPP parties; commitment of parties; open communication and 
trust; willingness to collaborate / compromise; respect for all parties; community outreach; political 
support; expert advice and review; risk awareness; and clear roles and responsibilities. In contrast Cheung 
 
 Page 32 of 142 
 
et al. (2012a) states that for PPP projects undertaken in Hong Kong and China there are seven critical 
success factors which are equitable allocation of risks; strong private consortium; judicious government 
control; transparent and efficient procurement process; project economic viability; adequate legal 
framework and stable political environment; and, available financial market.  
The difference in the types of critical success factors identified for these different countries and the 
difference in the numbers of critical success factors for each country can be argued to be indicative of 
the differences in the social, policy and economic context of undertaking PPP projects in the different 
countries. Factors which are common to projects in all locations, based on the above publications are 
good governance, adequate legal frameworks and available financial markets. 
Related to critical success factors, the World Economic Forum has also investigated the inefficiencies of 
infrastructure delivery globally and notes that while the PPP contracting model should enable the 
development of much needed infrastructure through utilising available private sector finance and 
efficient delivery capabilities, many eligible projects do not proceed, especially in developing countries.  
The reason for this paradox, according to the WEF (2013), is the lack of well prepared, projects that 
investors are willing to invest in.  This is supported by the South African National Treasury PPP Manual, 
Module 6 Managing the PPP Agreement, which highlights that the appointment of a good “project 
officer” by the relevant state department or PPP unit, is vital to the success of the project (National 
Treasury, 2004b). 
The World Economic Forum in its guidelines for infrastructure development has developed detailed 
guidelines for what are viewed as the four key steps that should be taken when developing PPP contracts 
and the risks that should be mitigated.  These steps can be summarised as putting a rigorous project 
preparation process in place; undertaking a bankable feasibility study; ensuring balanced risk allocation 
and appropriate legislation; and ensuring a conducive enabling environment is in place (World Economic 
Forum, 2013).  
Whether PPP contracting models have actually produced the results anticipated has not been extensively 
investigated. Raisbeck, Duffield, and Xu (2010) note that in Australia, “PPPs provide superior 
performance in both the cost and time dimensions, and that the PPP advantage increases (in absolute 
terms) with the size and complexity of projects”; however, according to Hodge and Greve (2009) the 
available literature is inconclusive as to the benefit of PPP contracts, even when only value for money, 
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is considered. This is supported by Spackman (2002), who, as noted above, observed that when 
considering UK PPP projects, it could not be concluded whether the PPP project savings outweighed the 
increases in setup costs, compared to alternative procurement approaches.  
Jefferies and Rowlinson (2016), report that in the UK, a form of PPP contracting, the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI), was used from 1992 to 2012.   PFIs were used to procure both social and economic 
infrastructure.  The particular innovation in the PFI contract was the use of a shadow payment by the 
government entity in place of the typical toll type payments used to provide the revenue required by the 
concessionaire. UK National Audit Office (NAO) reports into the performance of the PFI programme 
noted that the use of PFI procurement does improve project performance with regard to programme and 
costs; however, the cost of capital and transaction costs were higher than for conventional procurement.  
In addition the level of flexibility within PFI projects is generally poor so whether PFI procurement 
provides good value for money is unclear, which supports the conclusions of Spackman (2002).  Jefferies 
and Rowlinson (2016) note that where PFI procurement is used for economic infrastructure that aids 
economic growth, the benefits are much clearer. 
2.6 USE OF THE PPP MODEL FOR PROCUREMENT OF POWER GENERATION ENERGY FACILITIES 
On the use of PPP contracts to procure the construction and operation of renewable energy facilities, a 
few papers and articles have been produced. Dinica (2008) considers the role of PPP contracting in 
implementing the procurement of wind power installations in Spain and concludes that the PPP 
contracting structure was vital to the development of the wind power industry in Spain and allowing it 
to evolve from public private partnerships, which were necessary to mitigate the commercial and policy 
risks, to the use of fully private developments, over a period of 10 years. The PPP structure helped to 
reduce economic risks for private investors, while also creating a political climate willing to reduce risks 
embedded in the economic support instruments.  With regard to the success of the PPP projects in Spain,  
Dinica (2008:3570) notes, “trust in policy continuity has proved to be more important than high 
profitability.”  
Cravinho Martins, Cunha Marques, and Oliveira Cruz (2011) also analysed PPP contracting for wind 
projects, this time in Portugal. Rather than considering the impact of PPP contracting in developing the 
wind industry, Cravinho Martins et al. assessed the processes used for the PPP contracting of wind power 
in Portugal through a review of the first wind power project developed in Portugal using a PPP contract. 
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The article acknowledges the benefit of the private finance that was leveraged for the project through the 
use of the PPP contract and that the resultant cost of power supplied by the project is more expensive 
than for conventional power plants in Portugal.  The reason provided for the cost premium is the cost of 
wind technology at the time that the project was developed.  Whether the PPP contracting structure used 
added a premium to the costs is not considered.  
Eberhard et al. (2014) summarise the processes behind the South African PPP large scale renewable 
energy procurement programme, known as the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer 
Procurement Programme or the REIPPPP, and discusses the key lessons learned and the factors behind 
its success. It is noted that the programme demonstrates that if private sector equity and debt finance are 
required to fund such projects then a well-designed and transparent process is required, including a clear 
procurement framework, which is in agreement with the critical success factors outlined earlier by Li et 
al. (2005).  Eberhard et al. (2014) go on to note that in addition key risks must be mitigated by government 
and reasonable levels of profitability for investors must be allowed for. This research was undertaken 
after the initial rounds of the REIPPPP had been completed and the programme was running very 
successfully.  It does not include the later rounds of the REIPPP, which have been subject to considerable 
delays as noted by Oliphant (2016).  The reasons for this change in the level of success of the programmes 
do not appear to have been investigated. 
After the success of the initial rounds of the REIPPPP the South African government has also initiated a 
small projects independent power producer programme, or SPIPPP, designed to increase the participation 
of South African local businesses. “The Programme is aimed at emerging, smaller power developers (less 
than 5 MW) with an emphasis on South African and SME participation in Projects” (Independent Power 
Producer Procurement Programme Unit, n.d.). This resource provides the background to the different 
IPP programmes in South Africa but does not provide any analysis of how successful they are, or possible 
reasons for any shortcomings.  
As noted by Li et al. (2004), political commitment is vital for the success of PPP projects. To assist with 
getting the political commitment required for the South African renewable energy PPP programmes to 
succeed, various minimum economic development requirements were made compulsory aspects of the 
programme (Eberhard & Kaberger, 2016). The economic development aspects include areas such as local 
content, job creation, ownership, management control, preferential procurement, enterprise development 
and socioeconomic development.  
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2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The literature review has indicated that there is a large body of knowledge on the subject of infrastructure 
procurement, with efforts being made in a number of countries to find ways to improve the efficiency of 
the procurement processes. One of the procurement methods that is being increasing used around the 
world, particularly where public bodies have limited funding for capital projects, is the use of Public 
Private Partnership contracts.  However, PPP procurement must be carefully designed and managed for 
the projects to be successful, with a range of critical success factors proposed for PPP projects around 
the world. The use of PPP procurement in South Africa is not new, although it has only recently been 
applied to the procurement of energy projects in the form of the REIPPP and the SPIPPP programmes.  
While there appears to be some agreement in the literature between certain aspects of the PPP energy 
projects procured in South Africa and international best practice, no research appears to have been 
undertaken to assess how well these projects are being procured in South Africa.  
  
 




This chapter considers the research design that was used to undertake the investigations necessary in 
order to answer the questions, “What are the key factors that influence the outcome of energy projects 
procured using public private partnership contracts in South Africa?” and “What interventions could 
improve the success rates of projects procured using public private partnership contracts in South 
Africa?” The chapter first considers the philosophies informing management research, before discussing 
the methodologies available and the methods that were then used to collect the appropriate data to answer 
the research questions. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the trustworthiness and ethical 
aspects of the research. 
3.2 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY  
When considering the design of the research to be undertaken, which methodological approach to use 
must be decided. There are a number of methodological approaches available to a researcher undertaking 
management research. The choice of which approach to adopt is dependent on the research problem to 
be answered, as well as the the assumptions of what constitutes reality and what constitutes knowledge 
(Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Mason (2002) notes that important philosophical considerations which must 
be considered when designing research include assumptions concerning of the nature of reality, the 
ontological perspective, as well as what represents knowledge and how this is demonstrated, the 
epistemological perspective. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2012:18) add to this, indicating that 
“awareness of philosophical assumptions can both increase the quality of research and contribute to the 
creativity of the researcher.”  
The research questions to be answered require the analysis of data concerning procurement approaches, 
which are socially developed processes. Morgan and Smircich (1980:497) note that “the epistemology 
that views reality as a social construction focuses on analysing the specific processes through which 
reality is created. Here reality resides in the process through which it is created and possible knowledge 
is confined to an understanding of that process”.    
Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) further observe that when considering research epistemology, research can 
be classed as either positivist or social constructionist research. Positivist-based research generally 
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involves the use of observations, which can be measured objectively, to answer the research question and 
is often described as quantitative research, as noted by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004). In contrast, 
social constructionist research, described by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) as qualitative reseach, 
uses the experiences of people, individually and collectively, to answer a research question, a view 
supported by Silverman (1993). Marshall (1996:522) adds to this by noting that quantitative research 
approaches are used to, “test pre-determined hypotheses and produce generalizable results”; whereas 
qualitative studies are most useful for developing insights into and answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ type 
questions.  
The selection of the appropriate research methodology is dependent on the type of research being 
undertaken and the type of knowledge required to answer the questions posed.  Positivist research may 
use surveys or experiments to gather defined data on a particular problem, whereas Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2012) note that constructionist research may involve a wide range of methodologies, including action 
research, co-operative enquiry, archival research, ethnography and what they define as “narrative 
methods”.  This is supported by Crotty (1998:9) who with regard to the constructionist approach states 
that, “Meaning is not discovered, but constructed. In this understanding of knowledge, it is clear that 
different people may construct meaning in different ways, even in relation to the same phenomenon.”  
In some instances a methodology drawing on both qualitative and quantitative approaches may be 
appropriate, known as a mixed methods approach.  Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:20) observe that 
“the majority of mixed methods research designs can be developed from the two major types of mixed 
methods research: mixed model (mixing quantitative and qualitative approaches within or across the 
stages of the research process) and mixed method (the inclusion of a quantitative phase and a qualitative 
phase in an overall research study).”  
For this research, a social constructionist position was adopted as the context of the research questions is 
complex, requiring flexible and interpretative research approaches, which can be adjusted for the data as 
it is determined and analysed. The research design which was consequently utilised is summarised in 
Figure 3. 
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FIGURE 3: A SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN UTILISED 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
Once the research philosophy has been adopted, the appropriate research methodology must next be 
identified. Management research methodologies can include quantitative approaches, such as 
experiments and surveys, as well as qualitative approaches, which include action research and co-
operative enquiry, archival research, ethnography and narrative methods (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).  
The research methodology details the strategy and design of the research methods to be used (Crotty, 
1998). It was argued earlier that a social constructionist approach is appropriate to answer the research 
question since the procurement of large infrastructure projects using PPP procurement include many 
diverse perspectives. In addition to the constructionist research methodologies, such as action research, 
co-operative enquiry, archival research, ethnography and narrative methods, which are commonly used 
in management research, as noted by Easterby-Smith et al. (2012), other constructionist methodologies 
include content analysis, phenomenology and case studies, amongst others (Creswell, Hanson, Plano 
Clark, & Morales, 2007; White & Marsh, 2006).  
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Content analysis is a research methodology that originated from the study of mass communications in 
the 1950s and can be used for systematically analysing messages in any type of communication 
(Kondracki, Wellman, & Amundson, 2002; Krippendorff, 2013; White & Marsh, 2006). White and 
Marsh (2006) observe that content analysis is used in fields ranging from anthropology and political 
science to management and sociology and can be used in both quantitative and qualitative studies. 
Content analysis techniques have been in use since the 19th century and are commonly used in the 
communication, journalism, sociology, psychology and business sectors as well as in research for 
analysis of documents (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008).  
Elo and Kyngäs (2008) note that content analysis uses methods and techniques such as thematic analysis, 
which are of particular relevance for the analysis of texts such as newspaper articles, interview transcripts 
or peer reviewed papers and reports. The literature review has shown that there is a large body of research 
published on PPP procurement practice, from many countries around the world. The literature associated 
with the published PPP research is therefore available for use as a source of data to answer the research 
questions. Content analysis methods and techniques are therefore appropriate to use in conjunction with 
data gathering techniques such as systematic literature reviews and surveys to answer the research 
questions.  
In thematic analysis, a theme is defined by Vaismoradi, Turunen, and Bondas (2013:402) as “a coherent 
integration of the disparate pieces of data that constitute the findings. It captures something important 
about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of response pattern or 
meaning within the data set.” Themes can be identified using top down coding, or deductive processes, 
where researchers impose a predetermined coding scheme on a body of text, or a bottom up coding 
process, where relevant elements are identified inductively (Bergman, 2010; Vaismoradi et al., 2013). 
Once the initial themes, or first order categories, have been identified, then the themes can be grouped 
into second order or main categories using tools such as affinity diagrams (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). After 
the categories have been identified, the research can end at that point or can be analysed further using 
techniques such as the assessment of the relationships between the categories or examination of the 
structures and patterns of the categories, as indicated by (Bergman, 2010). This is supported by White 
and Marsh (2006:37) who note that when using qualitative content analysis methods, such as thematic 
analysis, to answer research questions, the researcher will read through the documentation and “tag key 
phrases and text segments that correspond to those questions, notes others that seem important but are 
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unexpected, sees similarities in expressing the same concept, and continues iteratively to compare the 
categories and constructs that emerge through this process.” Braun and Clarke (2006) summarise that 
“thematic analysis provides a flexible and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a rich and 
detailed, yet complex account of data.” 
Considering the diverse contexts of the research subject and the interpretive nature of the research 
questions, a content analysis based methodology was selected for the research. This methodology 
allowed the flexibility to use a range of methods and techniques, as described in the following section, 
to gather and process the data required for the research from different sources and analyse it as required 
in order to answer the research questions.  
The use of a number of different methods and techniques allowed triangulation of the results, which 
improved the trustworthiness of the outcome (Johansson, 2003). Furthermore, the ability to use multiple 
sources of data also increased the trustworthiness of the research results (Noor, 2008).  
3.4 METHODS 
The research questions, “What are the key factors that influence the outcome of energy projects procured 
using public private partnership contracts in South Africa?” and “What actions could be taken to improve 
the success rates of projects procured using public private partnership contracts in South Africa?”, require 
principles, or theories to be generated rather than principles or theories to be tested. Therefore an 
inductive approach to the research was taken, as opposed to a deductive approach (Johansson, 2003). 
This is supported by Thomas (2006:238) who states that “inductive analysis refers to approaches that 
primarily use detailed readings of raw data to derive concepts, themes or a model through interpretations 
made from the raw data by an evaluator or researcher.” The advantage of such an approach compared to 
deductive approaches, is that inductive approaches allow key themes to be identified which are often 
obscured or missed by the investigators as a result of preconceptions driven by the nature of data 
collection and analysis procedures used in deductive approaches (Thomas, 2006). This is in keeping with 
the content analysis research methodology selected, which is appropriate for inductive and deductive 
research, as noted by White and Marsh (2006) and Kondracki et al. (2002). 
This research used two different data gathering techniques, a systematic literature review and a survey.  
Inductive data analysis techniques were then applied to the data gathered, in order to gain additional 
insights.  Further details are provided in the sections below. 
 
 Page 41 of 142 
 
3.4.1 DATA COLLECTION  
SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
As a first step in gathering the data to answer the research questions, a systematic literature review was 
undertaken of published papers and articles. This provided an international view on the subject of critical 
success factors in Public Private Partnership energy projects, from literature published between 2000, 
which was the date of the earliest publication on PPP projects identified in the literature review and 2016, 
the date when the research study was started.  Systematic literature reviews are a means of synthesizing 
existing data from literature through the use of a defined process (Harden & Thomas, 2010) and can be 
undertaken using a number of different methods. Tranfield et al. (2003) note that systematic literature 
reviews are an important research tool as they are transparent and reproducible whereas traditional 
literature reviews can be biased by the researcher and often lack rigour.  
The method used for the systematic literature review was based on that proposed by Easterby-Smith et 
al. (2012), which includes the following steps: 
1. Documents for review must be peer reviewed; 
2. Clear search criteria are used and a defined number of databases searched; 
3. The required key data from the documents identified must then be extracted. 
SURVEY 
A web-based survey was sent to individuals working in the South African renewable energy PPP 
procurement industry, which, as mentioned in Chapter 2, consists of two PPP project programmes, the 
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) for projects of 
5MW or greater in generation capacity and the IPP Small Projects programme, which is for projects of 
between 1MW and 5MW in capacity. The aim of the survey was to gain a local outlook on the South 
African PPP projects in the energy sector. 
A purposive sampling design was used for the survey. Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) summarise that 
purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling design where the respondents invited to respond to a 
survey have been pre-screened by the researcher as meeting certain eligibility criteria. Tongco (2007) 
notes that purposive sampling is an inherently biased means of sampling; however, the method of 
sampling remains robust when compared to random probability sampling provided that the respondents 
are carefully selected based on industry knowledge and understanding. Seidler (1974) supports this and 
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adds that bias can be controlled using a number of techniques.  These include selecting a balanced set of 
informants resulting in a likely slight positive and negative bias, avoiding uninformed respondents and 
where possible standardise the perspectives of respondents by selecting occupants of specific positions.  
The individuals invited to respond to the survey undertaken to inform this research were all professionals 
working in the South African renewable energy industry and were selected from the researcher’s 
extensive network across the South African energy industry. To improve the level of confidence in the 
responses, and to ensure that the survey results would be as representative as possible of the different 
stakeholders in the industry, recipients were selected from the different stakeholder groups, including 
project developers, financiers, lawyers and engineering consultants, all of whom were known to be 
working in the South African PPP energy industry on a range of different project types, including wind, 
solar and hydro projects.   
The principles outlined by Easterby-Smith et al. (2012), of keeping the survey simple with one focus per 
question and the avoidance of jargon, colloquialisms and negatives, were used when designing the survey 
questions. Devers and Frankel (2000) note that where the research is exploratory or attempting to refine 
or discover concepts, then questions should be structured in an open manner. The survey questions for 
this research were therefore deliberately structured in an open manner and requested the respondents to 
provide their opinions on matters such as what the key success factors of the South African renewable 
energy procurement programme are, how it could be improved, lessons that could be learned from other 
similar procurement practices globally and the impact of recent changes to the programme.  This 
approach is in contrast to that used by other researchers investigating PPP critical success factors who, 
in almost all the articles reviewed, requested the survey respondents to select critical success factors from 
a predetermined list.  The survey for this research was designed to have both qualitative aspects to it as 
well as quantitative aspects to it as defined by Jansen (2010), as the diversity of answers were of interest 
as well as the frequency of any common responses. Tick box type questions were not used as these would 
not allow respondents to provide their own opinions and might exclude the provision of new or novel 
ideas. A copy of the survey consent form can be found in Appendix 1 and a copy of the survey template 
in Appendix 2. 
3.4.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
This section summarises the approach used for analysis of the data collected. As the research study did 
not set out to test whether the data was, “consistent with prior assumptions, theories or hypotheses 
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identified or constructed by an investigator” (Thomas, 2006:238), where a deductive approach to analysis 
would be appropriate, an inductive approach was used for the research using content analysis based 
techniques. Inductive approaches are used where a researcher wishes to allow the research findings to 
“emerge from the frequent, dominant or significant themes” present in the data (Thomas, 2006:238). The 
inductive approach therefore requires the researcher to assess the data collected to determine concepts, 
themes or a model. 
THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
The initial step of the data analysis undertaken, which can be found in Appendices 4 to 8, was to review 
the documents identified during the systematic literature review and use the principles of thematic 
analysis to identify any factors that had a significant influence on the outcome of energy projects procured 
using public private partnerships globally.  A two stage coding process was used. In the initial step, the 
documents were read and the key aspects, relating to the success or not of the projects, were recorded.  
This is the step in content analysis referred to by Krippendorff (1989:406), as unitising, where the units 
of analysis are defined and identified in the available data. In the second step, the key aspects were 
reviewed for similarities and those with similar themes were placed in groups.  The third step was the 
formation of an affinity diagram, which is a technique developed by anthropologist Jiro Kawakita 
(Mazur, 1993), through comparisons of the groups, into thematically similar clusters. Based on the 
themes of each cluster, a label was developed for the cluster, or critical success factor.  A similar process 
was used on the survey results data to derive a set of PPP critical success factors for the South African 
context.  The two sets of critical success factors were then compared, in order to determine whether there 
were any differences in the critical success factors, as well as how well they were performing on South 
African projects.  
The relationships between the critical success factors, which resulted from the analysis, were next 
explored using systems thinking based approaches and techniques.  These were used to develop feedback 
loops in order to better understand the system and as a result develop possible interventions in order to 
improve the system.  
The research process utilised is summarised in Figure 4. 
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FIGURE 4: THE CONTENT ANALYSIS RESEARCH PROCESS - ADAPTED FROM Krippendorff (1989:406)  
SYSTEMS THINKING BASED-ANALYSIS 
Systems thinking is a discipline that has developed out of the systems dynamics processes developed by 
Jay Forrester in the 1950s, where complex relationships are conceptualised and their impacts on each 
other and the wider system is assessed (Chaker et al.2015). Qualitative system dynamics can be described 
as a method to show system dynamic relationships, with feedback and interactions on the associated 
systems. Mingers (2015:323) notes that “system dynamics provides a practical approach to simulating 
complex dynamic systems based on influence diagrams and multiple cause diagrams.” This is supported 
by Wolstenholme (1982:555) who presents system dynamics as, “a system methodology, capable of 
assisting with practical problem definition, analysis and change in a wide range of systems.” System 
dynamics diagrams are based on the principles of control engineering and are also known as influence 
diagrams or causal loop diagrams (Wolstenholme, 1982).  
Causal loop diagrams are a tool which can be used to understand the nature of dynamic problems through 
the linking together of key variables into a system or mechanism (Kim, 1992). A system is defined by 
Toole (2005) as a collection of connected elements which influence each other. In order to improve the 
understanding of the relationships between the key variables in a system, these can be first analysed 
through the use of interrelationship diagraphs. Interrelationship diagraphs are a means of establishing the 
cause and effect relationships between a group of variables and are often used to investigate the 
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relationships between variables in problems where there is very little historical data (Brassard, 2011). 
Based on the results of the interrelationship diagraph, feedback loops are then identified, which are 
developed into causal loop diagrams (De Pinho, 2015a).  
Once the causal loop diagram representing the system or mechanism has been developed, possible 
interventions can then be identified which might result in changes to the outcome of the mechanism. The 
locations in a causal loop diagram, where interventions will have the greatest impact, are known as 
leverage points. Leverage points can be classified as low leverage points, where a small change or 
intervention will result in a small change in the behaviour of the system or high leverage points, where a 
small change or intervention causes a large change in the mechanism’s behaviour.  Low leverage points 
are used to address intermediate causes of a problem, whereas high leverage points are used to address 
the root causes to problems (De Pinho, 2015a). Appropriate interventions for each leverage point are then 
developed, based on the context and the desired outcome using CIMO-logic. CIMO-logic is a process 
where for a given mechanism (the M in CIMO and for this research this is the causal loop diagram that 
was developed) and considering context surrounding the problem (the C in CIMO) and the desired 
outcome (the O in CIMO), a logical intervention can be devised (Denyer et al.2008), considering the 
leverage points identified. 
As indicated above, the third analytical stage of the research study was the use of an interrelationship 
diagraph to investigate the relationships between the categories identified by the thematic analysis. Using 
the results of the thematic analysis, the interrelationship diagraph was developed as per the guidelines 
laid out by De Pinho (2015b). Each of the categories was assessed to determine whether they influenced 
the other categories and then an arrow was drawn to show the direction of influence.  Where two 
categories had different degrees of influence on each other, the arrow was drawn to show the direction 
of the greater level of influence (De Pinho, 2015a). 
The relationships identified by the interrelationship diagraph were used to determine possible feedback 
loops, which were then integrated into a causal loop diagram using the principles of qualitative system 
dynamics.  This mechanism was then analysed to determine possible interventions which could adjust 
the outcomes of the mechanism to produce the design result using the CIMO-logic process, which as 
outlined by Denyer et al. (2008) is as follows. In order to achieve an outcome ‘O’, using mechanism ‘M’ 
and considering context ‘C’, what intervention ‘I’ would be required? 
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3.5 TRUSTWORTHINESS AND ETHICS 
3.5.1 TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Research trustworthiness includes the concepts of credibility, transferability and dependability. As noted 
by Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Collier-Reed, Ingerman, and Berglund (2009) for the research to have 
credibility it must be designed, undertaken and communicated in such a manner that all of these aspects 
are credible and that the results can be scrutinised by the research community in order to judge for 
themselves the credibility and legitimacy of the research. As such, the research for this study has been 
designed and undertaken in a manner that ensures that it is repeatable, within the bounds of the study, 
while remaining appropriate to achieve the research goals. This is supported by Kondracki et al. 
(2002:226) which notes that “when properly applied content analysis methods are both reliable and 
valid.” 
The concept of transferability depends on the researcher providing sufficient detail for the reader to judge 
the level of similarity between the research undertaken and the specific context of the reader (Collier-
Reed et al., 2009). In keeping with this concept, the research has been undertaken and reported such that 
that it can be applied, not just to PPP projects in other sectors other than energy, but also in countries 
with a similar level of development to South Africa. 
Dependability of management research is essential, if research findings are to be consistent. Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) note that to ensure dependability the research must use appropriate methodology, including 
sampling and where possible, triangulation processes should have been used during the processing of the 
data. Triangulation is defined by Easterby-Smith et al. (2012:346) as “using different kinds of measures 
or perspectives in order to increase confidence in the accuracy of observations”. For this research, 
triangulation processes utilised included the use of two different data gathering methods (the systematic 
literature review and the survey) as well as ensuring that all literature review data was peer reviewed. 
The survey data also added to the trustworthiness of the research by providing local South African context 
for the research, as supported by Easterby-Smith et al. (2012). 
3.5.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THIS STUDY 
Bell and Bryman (2007) note that ethics are integral to every aspect of management research with the 
key areas being grouped as conflicts of interest and affiliation bias; power relations; harm, wrongdoing 
and risk; and confidentiality and anonymity.  Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) adds to this list, the need for 
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ensuring honesty and transparency in communicating about the research and the need for avoidance of 
any misleading or false reporting of research findings. 
Bell and Bryman (2007) observe that management researchers can be susceptible to conflicts of interest 
and affiliation bias, with management researchers, as with those in the scientific fields, having the 
potential to be influenced by matters relating to funding in how they conduct the research and the findings 
are presented. As such, management researchers should declare any conflicts of interest or affiliations 
that may influence the findings of the research. On the subject of the power relations between the 
researcher and interviewees, Bell and Bryman (2007) suggests that the power relations of both parties 
must be considered and their rights and interests protected, while on harm and wrongdoing they conclude 
that a balance should be found between the need to protect research participants and the need to undertake 
research that challenges powerful or well entrenched business organisations. Lastly, on the matter of 
confidentiality and anonymity, they observe that being overly prescriptive with ensuring confidentiality 
and anonymity can, in some cases, undermine the ability to undertake meaningful management research.  
Therefore, a balance must be found. 
With regard to the research undertaken for this dissertation, it is hereby confirmed that no funding was 
received from organisations with an entrenched position in the South African Public Private Partnership 
industry and as such no conflicts of interest or affiliation bias were present.  The research processes were 
also undertaken in such a manner as to minimise the impacts of any power relations and to ensure that 
no harm came to any of the research participants. All efforts were made to ensure that all communication 
concerning the research was undertaken in an honest and transparent manner and the research has been 
reported as accurately as is possible. Ethics approval for this research study can be found in Appendix 3 
– Ethics Approval Form. 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has considered the design used for the research undertaken in order to answer the questions, 
“What are the key factors that influence the outcome of energy projects procured using public private 
partnerships in South Africa?” and “What interventions could improve the success rates of projects 
procured using public private partnership contracts in South Africa.”  A social constructionist 
epistemology was adopted to guide the research, as the context of the research questions is complex 
requiring flexible research approaches, which can be adjusted for the data, as it is determined and 
 
 Page 48 of 142 
 
analysed.  To accommodate the need for a flexible research approach a content analysis-based 
methodology was utilised. 
Data for the research was gathered using a systematic literature review and a purposive survey of 
stakeholders in the South African energy industry. Inductive data analysis techniques were utilised to 
assess the data gathered.  An inductive approach was selected, as the research question required the 
generation of theories, as opposed to the testing of existing theories. The inductive approach was also 
appropriate for the analysis of the qualitative data, in the form of survey data and systematic literature 
review results, used in the research.  Data analysis techniques employed included thematic analysis, 
affinity diagrams, interrelationship diagraphs and causal loop diagrams.  
The chapter concludes with consideration of the trustworthiness and ethical aspects of the research. 
Regarding trustworthiness, triangulation processes were utilised that included the use of two different 
data gathering methods (the systematic literature review and the survey) as well as ensuring that all 
literature review data was peer reviewed.  Local context was included in the research, through the use of 
the survey. With regard to the ethical aspects of the research, it is hereby confirmed that no funding was 
received from organisations with an entrenched position in the South African Public Private Partnership 
industry and as such no conflicts of interest or affiliation bias were present.  The research processes were 
also undertaken in such a manner to minimise the impacts of any power relations and to ensure that no 
harm came to any of the research participants. 
The following chapter of the report considers the research results.  
 




In this section, the data collected using the systematic literature review and the survey is reported.  
4.2 SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW OUTCOME  
As a first step in the systematic literature review, the databases to be searched were selected. The Google 
Scholar, Emerald, Sage and Wiley Online databases were chosen as they included the research area of 
focus, as well as holding peer reviewed documents and papers, which was a requirement to ensure 
trustworthiness. The second step was to decide on the search strings to be used. 
An initial search for documents was made using the search terms, “Public Private Partnerships” and 
“energy generation” published between 2000 and 2016, which were available online and using all 
available search fields. 
The initial search results were as follows: 
• Emerald – 31 articles 
• EBSCOhost – 11 articles 
• Wiley Online – 11,500 articles 
• Google Scholar – 18,300 articles 
For databases that produced a significant number of results, these were then narrowed down to those 
articles that met the search terms, “public private partnerships”, “energy” and “procurement” using all 
search fields. The revised results were as follows:  
• Wiley Online – 1259 articles 
• Google Scholar – 18,000 articles 
As the number of articles identified was still greater than could be reviewed, the search was limited to 
articles that included the terms “public private partnerships”, “procurement” and “energy” in the abstract 
or where this option was not available, in the title.  However, this proved to be too prescriptive and 
resulted in 4 or less hits on the Wiley Online and Google Scholar databases. To make the search terms 
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less prescriptive the search was then run just using the “public private partnerships” and “energy” in the 
abstract or where this option was not available, in the title, which produced the following results: 
• Wiley Online – 21 articles 
• Google Scholar – 22 articles 
The search was also completed using the terms “public private partnerships” and “procurement” in the 
abstract or where this option was not available, in the title.  This search produced the following results: 
• Wiley Online – 25 articles 
• Google Scholar – 18,400 articles 
An analysis of the resultant articles from Emerald, EBSCOhost, and Wiley Online was then made to 
exclude any articles that matched the above search criteria but were not related to procurement of 
electricity generation projects.  As the Google Scholar search results were too extensive to be 
meaningfully analysed, the initial 20 documents identified by the last Google Scholar search were also 
investigated for relevance.  This analysis of the documents from all the databases for relevance resulted 
in the narrowing down of the documentation to the following: 
• Emerald – 2 articles 
• EBSCOhost – 2 articles 
• Wiley Online – 14 articles 
• Google Scholar – 14 articles 
Given the relatively small number of relevant articles resulting from the above searches and analysis, the 
search process was re-run using the search terms “public private partnerships” and “critical success 
factors” in the abstract (or title if “abstract” resulted in significant results) for peer reviewed publications 
dated between 2000 and 2016 and analysed for relevance. This resulted in an additional 13 articles as 
follows: 
• Emerald – 13 articles 
• EBSCOhost – 0 articles 
• Wiley Online – 0 articles 
• Google Scholar – 1 article 
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In total 46 relevant articles were thus sourced for thorough review and their details can be found in 
Appendix 4 – Systematic literature Review.  The results of the analysis of these sources is shown in 
Appendix 5 – Systematic Literature Review Affinity Diagram and Appendix 6 – Systematic Literature 
Review Thematic Analysis Results.  
In summary, the analysis of the systematic literature review results yielded eight critical success factor 
(CSF) categories relevant to international projects. The eight critical success factors, for energy projects 
developed using Public Private Partnerships to succeed, are as follows. They are not reported in any order 
of importance, as if any of them is not achieved, then the project is likely to fail. It is also argued that the 
PPP critical success factors identified for energy projects by the research are no different from those for 
other infrastructure projects, such as roads or water: 
• Commitment of Public and Private Parties 
• Effective Governance 
• Favourable PPP Framework 
• Identification of Suitable Projects 
• Competitive and Transparent Procurement 
• Strength of Consortium 
• Suitable Financial Conditions 
• Appropriate Risk Allocation and Risk Sharing 
The key aspects of each critical success factor identified by the research are discussed below: 
Commitment of Public and Private Parties 
The need for serious commitment of both public and private parties is seen as critical to the success of 
PPP projects in countries ranging from China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Australia and the UK to Nigeria 
(Ameyaw & Chan, 2013; Babatunde, Opawole, & Akinsiku, 2012; Cheung, Chan, & Kajewski, 2012b; 
Cheung et al., 2012a; Ismail, 2013).   Commitment from government can be demonstrated by designing 
policies which encourage private sector investment in infrastructure. However, such policies will usually 
require the projects to be structured such that both the private and the public sectors benefit or in other 
words both parties feel that value is added. For example Love et al. (2000:58) note that in the 
infrastructure policy for investment in the state of Victoria in Australia, dated 1994, “The Policy, 
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however, requires that a project is structured in a manner that is value-adding to both the private and the 
public sectors, that there are on-going benefits to both parties throughout the procurement process.” 
Commitment of public and private parties can be argued to also include ensuring that both governments 
and private sectors have the expertise to identify all of the relevant risks before entering into the 
partnership contract. Governments must also have the contract management skills to ensure that those 
risks are in fact borne by the private sector (Murphy, 2008). In some countries a dedicated PPP unit has 
been developed within the relevant government department to provide the administration strength 
required to develop the necessary legislation (Ameyaw & Chan, 2013; Jamali, 2004). In South Africa, 
when the PPP model was selected to deliver renewable energy projects, the availability of experienced 
advisory services to augment the available skills within the public sector was critical to the design and 
management of the PPP processes (Eberhard et al.2014).  This need to ensure that the public sector has 
sufficient expertise to deliver PPP projects is supported by Jamali (2004:428) who states that, “PPPs 
indeed often falter because of hastily prepared tender documents and contracts and negotiations taking 
place between unequally qualified and experienced professionals, mainly to the disadvantage of the 
representative from the public sector.” 
The need for strong political support for PPP projects is also seen as critical to the success of PPP projects 
and is a key aspect of this particular critical success factor, particularly in developing countries (Ameyaw 
& Chan, 2013; Babatunde et al., 2012; Wibowo & Alfen, 2015). To maintain the cost efficiencies that 
PPP contracts can bring, governments must honour the long time frames of the concessions as the lack 
of commitment to these long time frames can result in extensive additional transaction costs (Valero, 
2015).  
Effective Governance 
Effective Governance includes themes such as corruption avoidance and honouring of the contractual 
agreements by all parties and independence of the courts system. The need for effective governance of 
the legal processes governing PPP projects, including the independence of the courts systems and control 
of corruption, are seen as essential for PPP projects as without this the private sector will not provide the 
necessary investment as discussed by  Vagliasindi (2012), Beh (2010), Wibowo and Alfen (2015) and 
Ismail (2013). In Malaysia, Ismail (2013:13) notes that in a survey of the importance of critical success 
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factors in PPP projects, “Good governance was ranked first as a necessary factor to ensure the success 
of PPP projects.”  
Favourable PPP Framework 
Successful delivery of PPP projects requires a carefully considered, appropriate legal framework to be 
put in place, including the use of irrevocable contracts (Wibowo & Alfen, 2015).  In China and Hong 
Kong the need for a favourable PPP framework is considered the most important critical success factor 
for PPP projects (Cheung et al.2012a).  In Nigeria, Ghana and Malaysia a favourable PPP framework is 
also seen as a critical success factor (Babatunde et al., 2012; Ismail, 2013; Kwofie, Afram, & Botchway, 
2016).  However, in countries where the legal frameworks for PPP contracts are well developed, such as 
Australia and the UK, this critical success factor is given less importance, as observed by (Cheung et 
al.2012b:52) who on the importance of having a favourable legal framework in place, observes that 
“respondents from Australia and the UK ranked this success factor of medium importance only.”  
Identification of Suitable Projects 
Grimsey and Lewis (2000:117) note that when planning and delivering PPP projects, “the principal aim 
for the public sector is to achieve value for money in the services provided while ensuring that the private 
sector entities meet their contractual obligations properly and efficiently.” Water and transportation 
projects developed using PPP contracting will generally deliver reasonable efficiency gains and are 
therefore more appropriate for procurement using the PPP contracting model, whereas IT, hospitals and 
schools show minimal gains and are therefore less appropriate for procurement via this model (Ameyaw 
& Chan, 2013; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Iossa & Martimort, 2015). 
Identification of suitable projects for PPP contracting is thus a key success factor and ensuring that PPP 
projects provide value for money (VFM) is seen as one of the main metrics when judging whether 
projects are perceived as successful or not.  Judging value for money is a complex business and a number 
of countries, including South Africa, have developed formulas or value for money tests, known as Public 
Sector Comparitors (PSC).  However, as these value for money tests are highly dependent on the 
assumptions made, the use of competitive bidding should ensure value for money is achieved (Grimsey 
& Lewis, 2005), as it avoids the need for such assumptions. Grimsey and Lewis (2005:375) go on to note 
that there is value in the use of the Public Sector Comparitor approach as “Its development constitutes a 
 
 Page 54 of 142 
 
valuable discipline upon public sector procurement in assisting decision makers to understand the project, 
the risks involved and how to deal with them contractually.”  
In the UK, excluding software projects, PPP projects on average cost 9% less than using alternative 
procurement routes (Ball & King, 2006), while in Australia the level of improved cost effectiveness 
ranges from 11% to 30% (Raisbeck et al., 2010). Grimsey and Lewis (2005) also notes that in sectors 
where PPP contracting has been used for some time, value for money assessments are often not required. 
In Nigeria, Babatunde et al. (2012) note that in their research, transportation projects were best for PPP 
contracts, followed by electricity and water projects.  Education and real estate projects were judged to 
be the least suitable for delivery using PPP contracting. 
Regarding project scale, the advantage of using the PPP delivery route has been shown to increase as the 
size and complexity of projects increases (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). In Holland the PPP delivery route 
must be considered for all projects over a certain capital value, which in 2007 was €25 million (Zeegers 
& Ang, 2007), while in Canada the PPP delivery route is the model of choice, for delivering large 
infrastructure works (Siemiatycki, 2015). 
Competitive and Transparent Procurement 
Competitive and Transparent Procurement is identified as a critical success factor as it is necessary in 
order for the private sector to partner successfully with the public sector. The need to ensure competitive 
and transparent procurement as a condition of using private finance is an essential condition for private 
sector involvement, as confirmed by (Eberhard et al.2014) and (Coviello, Gollan, & Perez, 2012).  
However, care must be taken to ensure competitive bidding and hence that the projects provide value for 
money, in markets with few major players (Mols, 2010). This problem is not unique though to PPP 
procurement as “over-dependence on one supplier and asymmetric lock-in can equally occur in more 
traditional forms of procurement” (Mols, 2010:242). 
In a competitive bidding environment the private sector requires there to be a reasonable chance of 
success, hence where individual PPP contracts are to be awarded then usually no more than three bidders 
should be invited (Ball & King, 2006). However, where multiple contracts are available, then multiple 
bid winners are an important incentive for the private sector to participate (Eberhard et al.2014). 
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Strength of Consortium 
Project partnerships needs sufficient expertise to deliver high quality services to meet the needs of all the 
project partners. Indeed Ameyaw and Chan (2016:128) notes that for PPP projects “a consortium’s lack 
of appropriate knowledge and skills is the significant failure factor.” The strength of the consortium is 
therefore a critical success factor for the delivery of PPP projects. The strength of the consortium 
delivering the PPP project is identified as a critical success factor in Ghana, the UK, Australia, Hong 
Kong and China (Ameyaw & Chan, 2013; Cheung et al., 2012b; Li, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 
2005a).   
Suitable Financial Conditions 
Suitable Financial Conditions includes the “Stable Macro-Economic Conditions” theme, which is 
sometimes reported as well as the “Suitable Financial Market” theme identified by some researchers as 
a critical success factor. In countries where suitable financial markets exist and have stable macro-
economic conditions, such as the UK and Australia, this critical success factor did not feature as strongly 
in the literature; however, in locations such as China where there are financial restrictions this critical 
success factor is seen as very important (Cheung et al., 2012b; Cheung et al., 2012a). In Nigeria the 
presence of sound economic policies and a suitable financial market are seen as the top two critical 
success factors (Babatunde et al., 2012), while in Malaysia they are both in the top five critical success 
factors (Ismail, 2013) and in Ghana they are numbers five and six respectively (Kwofie et al., 2016). 
Kwofie et al. (2016:69) go on to state that “appropriate economic policies that lead to a stable and 
growing environment are sine qua non to enhancing success on PPP projects and as such remain the 
much sought-after success factor by stakeholders and parties in PPPs”. 
Appropriate Risk Allocation and Risk Sharing 
The Appropriate Risk Allocation and Risk Sharing critical success factor assumes that the PPP model is 
set up to ensure that the party best able to manage a risk is given responsibility for managing that risk. 
As stated previously, one of the key reasons for using the PPP contracting structure is to transfer certain 
risks from the public sector to the private sector, particularly those related to the delivery and operations 
of the facilities (Li et al., 2005a). However, Takashima, Yagi, and Takamori (2010) make the point that 
due to project uncertainties, the long timeframes of the contracts and the risk capital involved, many such 
projects are not feasible without the mitigation of certain risks by government. This is supported by 
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(Eberhard et al.2014) who note that the mitigation of key risks by government is one of the main 
requirements for investment in PPP infrastructure projects, such as utility scale renewable energy 
generation projects in South Africa. Hence one of the critical factors determining whether a PPP project 
will be successful or not is the proper and reasonable sharing of risks between the private and public 
sector parties to the project. 
For appropriate risk allocation in PPPs to take place, governments must have the expertise to identify all 
of the relevant risks before entering into the partnership contract. Governments must also have the 
contract management skills to ensure that the appropriate risks are borne by the private sector (Murphy, 
2008). However, PPPs where public and private sectors are involved in all phases of a project are more 
attractive to the private sector since the risks are shared by government (Coviello et al., 2012) and so are 
more likely to be successful.  This is supported by Siemiatycki (2015: 359) who notes that “one of the 
success factors in Canadian PPPs is the public sector maintaining a strong role in owning the asset, 
designing project specifications, and ensuring public control related to key features of their long-term 
operations.” In Canada, contract re-negotiations on PPP transportation projects where anticipated user 
demand has not been met, have been avoided through structuring the project revenues based on 
availability of the facilities rather than user based charging (Siemiatycki, 2015), thus moving the risk 
from the private sector to the public sector. 
4.3 SURVEY RESULTS 
Twelve responses to the survey requests were received and the results analysed as described in Chapter 
3.  Key findings from the analysis of the survey results can be summarised as follows. The full list of 
survey responses can be found in Appendix 7 – Survey Responses. 
Six critical success factor themes were identified from the survey results.  Of these six, five themes are 
in common with the results of the systematic literature review and are: the need for reduced political 
uncertainty; improved commitment of the public sector parties; improved commitments to development 
programmes; the need for reductions in the cost of project development; and the need for the PPP 
programmes to be well planned, but also to be able to evolve. In addition to these five critical success 
factor themes, an additional theme was identified which is economic development.  
The need for improved commitment of the public sector parties, improved commitments to development 
programmes and reductions in project development costs themes are clearly linked to the critical success 
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factor “Commitment of Private and Public Parties”. An example survey response received was that 
“delays cause uncertainty which increases the risk as well as cost of the project”, which clearly 
demonstrates the importance to the success of the project of all the project parties being fully committed 
to the project.  
An example response to the survey question on which areas of the REIPPP programme would be 
improved is, “the current political uncertainty should be addressed head on to provide all participants 
with confidence in the programme,” which supports the need for reduced political uncertainty theme, 
which in turn can be aligned with the critical success factor “Effective Governance”.  
The themes around programme planning and programme evolution support the “Favourable PPP 
Framework” critical success factor and the need for government to back certain key risks supports the 
critical success factor “Appropriate Risk Allocation and Risk Sharing”. 
As mentioned above, a sixth key theme was identified from the survey results, which is economic 
development, and is a finding that is in addition to the findings which resulted from the systematic 
literature review analysis. Associated findings from the analysis of the survey results include sub-themes 
such as the importance of the use of localisation requirements within the PPP frameworks as a tool to 
improve the development of the country as a whole, as well as the need to ensure that the localisation 
requirements are carefully planned and kept in balance with the other aims of the programmes, such as 
ensuring electricity tariff reductions.  A quotation taken from the survey responses (see responses to 
survey question 4 in Appendix 7) is, “while EDO (Economic Development Obligation) initiatives are to 
be applauded, localization must not impede advantages in the global market to further reduce tariffs”.  
Critical Success Factor Performance Analysis 
Further analysis of the themes resulting from the analysis of the survey results was undertaken and from 
this analysis it can be argued that while some of the critical success factors identified are working as 
planned, certain of the critical success factors are not performing at a level where they remain successful 
and work is required in these areas.  The critical success factors which are performing well are Favourable 
PPP Framework and Competitive and Transparent Procurement.  
The critical success factors which are identified as requiring improvement if the South African PPP 
programmes are to continue to be successful are the Effective Governance and the Commitment of the 
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Public and Private Parties critical success factors. The analysis also identified that there are various 
technical aspects of the Favourable PPP Framework critical success factor which although this critical 
success factor is currently working as intended, could be enhanced further, such as permitting the 
inclusion of time of use tariffs and energy storage. 
The following table, Table 1, shows the results from the analysis of the survey responses. The table 
shows the initial and principal themes developed, as well as which of the critical success factors are 
working as intended and those which require attention.
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TABLE 1: THEMES AND CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS EXTRACTED FROM THE SURVEY RESPONSES 
Survey Questions 
Initial Themes Extracted from the 
Survey Responses 
Principal Themes Developed  Performance Analysis 
Q1: What are the key factors that you 
perceive are behind the success of the 
REIPPP programme? 
REIPPPP success factors are programme 
transparency, bankable PPA, government 
backing of the buyer giving guaranteed 
sales, well designed tariffs, experienced 
PPP office 
Transparency, predictability, well 
designed programme 
The Favourable PPP 
Framework, Effective 
Governance, Competitive and 
Transparent Procurement critical 
success factors appear to be 
working as required. 
Q2: Are there particular aspects of the 
REIPPP programme that could be 
improved? 
Reduced political uncertainty, improved 
consistency of timing of PPP programme 
Predictability and timing The Effective Governance and 
Commitment of Private and 
Public Parties critical success 
factors appear to require 
improvement 
Q3: What is the minimum size of project 
that is appropriate for auction systems, such 
as the REIPPP programme, in US$? 
US$3 - 65 million  N/A 
Q4: Which aspects, if any, that are used in 
other programmes internationally should be 
considered for future bid windows of the 
REIPPP? 
Alternative sources of revenue, national 
benefit of local content requirements 
compared to ability to reduce costs 
further need investigation. 
Programme localisation and 
evolution 
The Commitment of Private and 
Public Parties critical success 
factor appears to need 
improvement. 
Q5: It is noted that the delays in preferred 
bidder announcements and extensions of 
0% up to 10% Programme predictability The Commitment of Private and 
Public Parties critical success 
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Survey Questions 
Initial Themes Extracted from the 
Survey Responses 
Principal Themes Developed  Performance Analysis 
financial close dates cause economic 
uncertainty for developers and investors.  
What level of premium do you add to your 
tariff to compensate for delays in 
announcement of preferred bidders and 
financial close? 
factor appears to need 
improvement. 
Q6: Given the high level of competitiveness 
of the wind and solar aspects of the REIPPP 
programme and hence the low success rates, 
could the high cost of bidding could be seen 
by some as a deterrence to potential 
bidders? 
high bid cost and low success rates are 
seen by 10 of the 12 respondents as a 
deterrence to potential bidders 
Programme design  
Q7: Is the level of oversight of the projects 
during the construction and operation 
stages, that required by the DoE, 
appropriate for PPP projects of this scale? 
 
10 of 12 respondents see the level of 
oversight during construction and 
operations as appropriate. 
Programme design and economic 
development 
N/A 
Q8: In contrast to the initial Bid Windows, 
the DoE adjusted the bid requirements for 
later bid windows such that developers did 
not need to have a confirmed lender and 
Improvements to PPP programme seen as 
a welcome change, changes lead to 
benefits for project developers, lenders 
and consumers 
Programme evolution The Commitment of Private and 
Public Parties critical success 
factor appear to be working as 
required. 
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Survey Questions 
Initial Themes Extracted from the 
Survey Responses 
Principal Themes Developed  Performance Analysis 
EPC confirmed prior to bid submission.  
Please could you comment on the 
consequences of this change, including 
whether this reduced bidding costs; enabled 
some developers to submit “low ball” bids 
that risk not being able to reach financial 
close; and whether this change enable 
developers to agree better terms with both 
lenders and EPCs since terms would only 
be agreed once the developers are 
confirmed as preferred bidders. 
Q9: Given the rules and requirements of the 
REIPPP programme and / or the SPIPPs 
programme what are the non-government or 
Eskom related key factors that determine 
whether a project will be delivered 
successfully? 
Eskom factors seen by 8 of 12 
respondents as key risk areas e.g. Grid 
code compliance and grid connection 
costs, other risks from extent of EPC 
experience 
Project cost and competencies of 
project participants 
The Commitment of Private and 
Public Parties critical success 
factor OR appears to need 
improvement. 
Q10: Are there areas where the South 
African renewable energy industry (finance, 
legal, consultants, contracts, other?) could 
improve in order to time and cost of project 
delivery further? 
Potential areas for industry improvement 
are improved programme management, 
Cost reductions across the project facets, 
particularly legal 
Programme design, economic 
development and cost reduction. 
The Favourable PPP Framework 
critical success factor although 
currently performing has 
potential for further 
improvement. 
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4.4 ANALYSIS OF THE CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
After identification of the critical success factors, the next step of the analysis was to assess the 
relationships between them. The analysis utilised techniques such as interrelationship diagraphs and 
causal loop diagrams, as discussed in Chapter 3.   
In order to determine the presence of any relationships between the critical success factors identified, the 
data was reassessed.  Directional relationships between each of the critical success factors were decided 
upon based on what Yan and Horwitz (2008) call “correlational or associative connotations” of the data 
associated with each critical success factor, including consideration of the local contexts of each factor, 
such as  the local environment, legislation and actual PPP project results. Critical success factors that had 
an influence on the other were linked by an arrow, with the direction of the arrow pointing in the direction 
of influence (Yan & Horwitz, 2008). The combined set of influences is shown in the interrelationship 
diagraph, in Figure 5.  
The critical success factors were then classified as either “Driver” or “Outcome” factors according to 
whether they had a greater number of arrows leaving the factor (Driver) or going into the factor 
(Outcome) (Yan & Horwitz, 2008). The “Key Outcome” variable is the variable that is influenced by the 
most variables (De Pinho, 2015a), in other words it has the most arrows feeding into it. The “Key Driver” 
factor is the variable which has the most arrows leaving it and is therefore the most influential variable 
as this is the location where a possible intervention will be most effective in a causal loop mechanism 
(De Pinho, 2015b).  Which of the critical success factors are Drivers and which are Outcomes is shown 
in Table 2. 
Other locations where possible interventions might have leverage to enable change, albeit it in a less 
effective manner, will be through the other driver variables, which are shown in Table 2. In this manner, 
an understanding of the relationships of each of the critical success factors with the other factors was 
created. Although nine critical success factors were assessed and each therefore has eight potential 
relationships with other factors, in some cases no relationship could be established. Therefore, for that 
particular factor, the number of relationships was less than eight. Two factors were identified which were 
influenced by less than eight factors.  One was the Identification of Suitable Projects factor, which links 
to six other factors, while the other is the Competitive and Transparent Procurement factor, which links 
to seven other factors. 
 
 Page 63 of 142 
 
In this analysis two Key Driver variables were identified which are the Effective Governance critical 
success factor and the Commitment of Public and Private Parties critical success factor. Both of these 
critical success factors were found to have a relationship with all of the other eight critical success factors 
and influence all but one of the other factors. 
The Effective Governance critical success factor is influenced by the Commitment of Public and Private 
Parties critical success factor and in turn influences all the other critical success factors. The Effective 
Governance critical success factor would have been expected to drive all the other critical success factors 
as the importance of there being an independent judicial system, as well as control of corruption is quoted 
as being essential for the private sector to provide the necessary investment for such infrastructure 
projects, as discussed in Section 4.2 above.  However, in the case of energy PPP projects in South Africa, 
the commitment of certain public bodies, such as Eskom and the Department of Energy, would appear 
to be determining the success of the PPP programmes in practice, as is highlighted by the survey 
responses and sources such as Oliphant (2016). Therefore, the Commitment of Public and Private Parties 
critical success factor is, in South Africa, driving the Effective Governance critical success factor. 
 
 Page 64 of 142 
 
 
FIGURE 5: PPP PROJECTS CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR INTERRELATIONSHIP DIAGRAPH 
The Commitment of Public and Private Parties critical success factors is influenced by the Favourable 
PPP Framework critical success factor as is argued above in Section 4.2 and in turn influences all the 
other critical success factors.  This is supported by the fact that commitment of certain public bodies, 
such as Eskom and the Department of Energy, would appear to be determining the success of the PPP 
programmes in practice as is highlighted by the survey responses and sources such as Oliphant (2016). 
The Key Outcome was identified as the Economic Development critical success factor, which aligns with 
the reasons for initiating the South African PPP energy programmes, which were to enable the South 
African economy to benefit from the foreseen cost reductions in renewable energy as the technologies 
developed over time (Department of Energy, 2015). 
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TABLE 2: CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR RELATIONSHIPS 
Critical Success Factor No. of Arrows 
Indicating Level of 
Influenced By 
Others 
No. of Arrows 




Economic Development 8 0 Key Outcome 
Effective Governance 1 7 Key Driver 1 
Commitment of Public and Private 
Parties 
1 7 Key Driver 2 
Favourable PPP Framework 2 6 Driver 
Appropriate Risk Allocation and Risk 
Sharing 
7 1 Outcome 
Suitable Financial Conditions 2 6 Driver 
Competitive and Transparent 
Procurement 
3 4 Driver 
Strength of Consortium 5 3 Outcome 
Identification of Projects Suitable for 
PPP Contracting 
4 2 Outcome 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the results of the interrelationship diagraph were developed into a systems 
dynamic diagram, known as a causal loop diagram, as shown in Figure 6, focussed on improving the 
Economic Development variable, as this was the Key Outcome variable derived from the 
interrelationship diagraph. Through considering the context and the desired outcomes of the causal loop 
diagram, possible interventions were identified using CIMO-logic, which if implemented would result 
in improvements to the Key Outcome, in other words, would result in increases in the levels of economic 
development achieved.  
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The causal loop diagram which was developed is based on the Success to the Successful archetype closed 
loop diagram, as described by ISEE Systems (2006) and Wolstenholme (2003). System archetypes are a 
“formal and free-standing way of classifying structures responsible for generic patterns of behaviour over 
time, particularly counter-intuitive behaviour” (Wolstenholme, 2003:8). The proposed mechanism 
consists of three loops, one of which is a feedback loop. This mechanism is shown in Figure 6. The 
relationships between these loops and the variables that they consist of, are detailed below. 
 
FIGURE 6: SOUTH AFRICAN ENERGY PPP PROJECTS CLD 
The relationships can be summarised as follows: The upper loop, which is the enabling loop, contains 
the critical success factors which are required to ensure that an appropriate environment is in place to 
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enable the projects, which are the driver critical success factors.  The upper loop of the mechanism 
therefore drives the lower loop, the delivery loop, which consists of outcome critical success factors. The 
performance of the delivery loop then impacts on the appetite of the private and public sectors for more 
of such projects, via the feedback loop.  Typically for this archetype, if the common variable shared by 
the two loops has a finite level of resource then the one loop will gain at the other’s expense (Systems, 
2016; Wolstenholme, 2003); however, if the common factor is not limited, as in this case, then logically 
each loop can benefit from the other in a virtuous cycle and improve all the factors, or conversely can 
drag the other into a negative spiral and lower the ability to successfully deliver the projects.  
In accordance with the interrelationship diagraph developed for this research, the Commitment of Public 
and Private Parties critical success factor is the only critical success factor which influences the Effective 
Governance critical success factor, which in turn ensures that the Competitive and Transparent 
Procurement critical success factor is achieved, which influences whether there are Suitable Financial 
Conditions, which is a precursor for a Favourable PPP Framework being put in place. The loop is a 
reinforcing loop, as indicated by the letter ‘R’, as an improvement in any particular variable will result 
in an improvement in the adjacent variable and so forth leading to an improvement in the system.  
The lower loop of the causal loop diagram, the delivery loop, as stated above, contains the outcome-type 
critical success factor variables that relate to the delivery of the projects, Favourable PPP Programme, 
Strength of Consortium, Appropriate Risk Allocation and Risk Sharing, Identification of Suitable 
Projects and the key outcome variable, Economic Development. As with the upper loop, the lower loop 
is also a reinforcing loop as the improvement of any particular variable will result in the following 
variable also improving and over time the loop improving as a whole.   
In summary therefore, to drive improvements in the key outcome variable, Economic Development, 
improvements should be first sought in the five critical success factors, which make up the enabling loop, 
i.e. the Commitment of Public and Private Parties factor, the Effective Governance factor, the 
Competitive and Transparent Procurement factor, the Suitability of Financial Conditions factor and the 
Favourability of PPP Framework factor. These factors have all been indicated, through the 
interrelationship diagraph, as driver factors and so would have the most leverage to improve the operation 
of the mechanism. They would therefore be the most effective means of improving the key outcome 
variable, particularly where available resources are limited. Of these driver factors, the factors with the 
most leverage are those that are the most influential, which as previously stated, are the Key Driver 
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factors, which in this mechanism are the Effective Governance critical success factor and the 
Commitment of Public and Private Parties critical success factor. 
4.4.1 INTERVENTIONS 
Using the results of the interrelationship diagraph and the CIMO-logic process as described in Chapter 
3, the points of greatest leverage in the causal loop mechanism were identified and some possible 
interventions have been proposed, which would act to maximise the levels of economic development 
achieved.  All of the interventions identified, act on variables in the Enabling Loop in order to maximise 
their impact as these driver variables have the greatest degree of leverage. It can also be argued that as 
the enabling loop drives the delivery loop, interventions focussed on variables in the enabling loop have 
the greatest level of impact. The full CIMO diagram can be in Appendix 8. The interventions identified 
are: 
1. Undertake root cause analysis to understand the reasons for lack of commitment for the critical 
success factor, “Commitment of Public and Private Parties”. Improving the level of commitment 
of the all the consortium partners, in particular the public parties, will act to improve the standards 
of governance of the project parties. This will result in more competitive and more transparent 
procurement processes, which will in turn lead to improved financial conditions for the projects. 
This will then enable further improvements to the PPP framework to be incorporated which will 
logically then drive improvements in the Strengths of the Consortium, which will in turn improve 
how risks are allocated.  This will then result in additional projects being identified as viable, 
which will then, assuming that the projects are then developed, result in increased levels of 
economic development of the country.  
2. Review barriers and opportunities to reduce the cost of finance of PPP projects in South Africa 
and hence improve the critical success factor, “Suitable Financial Conditions”. This will enable 
the PPP framework to be improved, as per intervention 1 and will drive the improvement of the 
delivery loop critical success factors which will then, assuming that the additional projects 
identified are then developed, result in increased levels of economic development of the country. 
3. Undertake regular reviews to ensure PPP framework remains favourable to both public and 
private parties and hence improve the “Favourable PPP Framework” critical success factor. This 
will, as per interventions 1 and 2, ultimately result in increased levels of economic development 
of the country.  
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4. Review barriers and opportunities to increase local content of projects. This intervention, 
although acting directly on the “Favourable PPP framework” critical success factor, will still need 
to work through the lower loop of the mechanism in order for the desired increase in the 
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4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis has identified eight critical success factors associated with successful PPP projects globally 
and found that of these, four are also applicable to South African projects. The analysis has also identified 
an additional critical success factor that is applicable to South African PPP projects.  Furthermore, the 
findings show that two of the critical success factors (Favourable PPP Framework and Competitive and 
Transparent Procurement) are performing well, while work is required on two of the critical success 
factors (Effective Governance and Commitment of the Public and Private Parties), if PPP projects are to 
continue to be successful in South Africa. 
The additional critical success factor identified by the analysis for South African projects in particular, 
is Economic Development.  The Economic Development critical success factor is representative of the 
overall success of PPP projects in South Africa and as a result is influenced by all of the critical success 
factors identified. 
To gain an understanding of the relationships between the critical success factors, an interrelationship 
diagraph and a causal loop diagram were developed. The interrelationship diagraph indicated the type of 
relationship between each of the critical success factors with the other critical success factors, while the 
causal loop diagram portrayed the feedback structures and dynamic relationships between the critical 
success factors. Analysis of the ID and the CLD demonstrated that the critical success factors are not all 
equal in value.  Rather, that interventions made to certain of the critical success factors, the driver critical 
success factors, would be more effective at improving the ability of the mechanism to drive an 
improvement in the key outcome than making interventions to other critical success factors.  
Through the use of the causal loop diagram, four interventions were identified, which if put in place, 
would act to improve the critical success factors through improving the effectiveness of PPP procurement 
in the energy sector in South Africa, which will in turn increase the levels of economic development in 
the country.  
A discussion of these results follows in the next chapter. 
  
 




In this section, the results of the systematic literature review and the survey are discussed and compared.  
A discussion of the wider evidence available to confirm these findings is also included. 
5.2 DISCUSSION 
This research study is focussed on answering the questions, “What are the key factors that influence the 
outcome of PPP energy projects in South Africa?” and “What interventions could improve the success 
rates of projects procured using public private partnership contracts in South Africa?” In answering the 
questions, through analysis of the international research and the survey results, eight key critical success 
factors, as shown in Table 3, were identified, of which four were also identified by the survey respondents 
as being particularly pertinent to South African projects.  A ninth critical success factor is also proposed 
for South African projects. 
Depending on the project type and location, the number of critical success factors for PPP projects 
identified in the literature can vary from five up to fifteen, as indicated by Li et al. (2004), Cheung et al. 
(2012a) and Jacobson and Sang (2008). With the exception of the Economic Development critical 
success factor and the Identification of Projects Suitable for PPP Contracting critical success factor, the 
remaining seven critical success factors identified in the research, or critical success factors similar to 
them, are all included in the collection of critical success factors listed in these papers.  
How successful the South African energy PPP procurement programmes are actually proving to be and 
where further work is required, based on the research results, is discussed below. A number of possible 
interventions to improve the way in which PPP projects are undertaken in South Africa were identified 
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Table 3: Critical Success Factors Identified by the Research 
International Critical Success Factors Pertinent to South African Projects 
• Commitment of public and private partners  
• Effective governance  
• Favourable PPP framework 
• Appropriate risk allocation and risk sharing   
Additional Critical Success Factors Relevant for International Projects 
• Suitable financial conditions 
• Competitive and transparent procurement  
• Strength of consortium  
• Identification of projects suitable for PPP contracting  
Additional Critical Success Factor Pertinent to South African Projects 
• Economic development 
 
5.2.1 EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE, FAVOURABLE PPP FRAMEWORK AND SUITABLE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS CRITICAL 
SUCCESS FACTORS 
The success of a framework put in place to enable the implementation of PPP projects will have to be 
evaluated against the needs of the different stakeholders.  However, as of January 2018, up to date data 
for the number of projects that have completed construction and are now operational, under the South 
African REIPPP programme, is not readily available. In April 2015, 41 projects were reported as being 
operational (earthworks, n.d.) and by 2015, the total contracted although not necessarily yet operational 
was 92, with a total investment committed of US$19 billion (Eberhard & Kaberger, 2016). This implies 
that a favourable and well considered legal framework has been put in place for these PPP projects, hence 
the Favourable PPP Framework, Effective Governance and Appropriate Risk Allocation and Risk 
Sharing critical success factors would appear to be in place for renewable energy PPP projects in South 
Africa. This is supported by the research survey results.  The quantum of private sector investment in the 
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South African REIPPP programme as detailed above would also suggest that the Suitable Financial 
Conditions critical success factor has been met and that Effective Governance measures are in place. 
The importance of the effective governance critical success factor is noted by The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (2008) which states that there is a PPP projects development maturity 
curve, which can be divided into three main stages as shown in Table 4. Furthermore, this guidebook 
goes on to observe that, “moving up the maturity curve is not automatic and PPPs have proved difficult 
to implement in many countries. The main reason for this is the need to develop institutions, processes 
and procedures to deliver PPP projects. The lack of well performing institutions in many countries is 
reflected in several things such as the protracted length of negotiations between public and private 
partners, the slowness of reaching closure, the lack of flexibility in risk sharing, and the cancellation of 
many projects with all the resultant waste” (United Nations2008:8). 
TABLE 4:  THE THREE STAGES OF PPP DEVELOPMENT (UNITED NATIONS, 2008:7) 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
• Define policy framework 
• Test legal viability 
• Identify project pipeline 
• Develop foundation concepts 
(PSCs etc) 
• Apply lessons from earliest 
deals to other sectors 
• Start to build marketplace 
• Introduce legislative reform 
• Publish policy and practice 
guidelines 
• Establish dedicated PPP units 
• Refine PPP delivery models 
• Continue to foster marketplace 
• Expand project pipeline and 
extend to new sectors 
• Leverage new sources of funds 
• Fully defined comprehensive 
“system” established 
• Legal impediments removed 
• PPP models refined and 
reproduced 
• Sophisticated risk allocation 
• Committed deal flow 
• Long-term political consensus 
• Use of full-range of funding 
sources 
• Thriving infrastructure market 
involving pension funds and 
private equity funds 
• Well-training civil service 
utilises PPP experience 
 
5.2.2 COMPETITIVE AND TRANSPARENT PROCUREMENT AND COMMITMENT OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PARTNERS 
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
The initial high level of commitment of the public sector aspects of the South African REIPPPP projects 
is evidenced by the setting up of a dedicated PPP unit, led by an individual highly experienced in the 
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development of PPP projects as well as extensive experience of working with the private sector (Eberhard 
et al., 2014). The high level of commitment of the private partners is supported by the fact that when the 
REIPPPP was launched in 2011 it was expected that 3,725MW of projects would be procured through 
five bidding rounds; however, this total allocation was taken up in the first three rounds (Papapetrou, 
2014), which shows the popularity of the program with the private sector. Indeed international accolades 
have been earned for the development and design of the REIPPPP (Department of Energy, 2015), which 
would appear to be support for the Competitive and Transparent Procurement critical success factor being 
in place.  However, the level of commitment of the public sector in the REIPPPP bidding rounds since 
bid window 3 has, unfortunately, been diminishing with delays to financial close being caused by Eskom 
refusing to sign PPAs, or issue final quotations for the cost of grid connection works, as evidenced by 
the survey responses and sources such as the Business Day newspaper (Oliphant, 2016). As noted by one 
survey respondent, these delays place financial strains on development companies, which must find 
alternative sources of income for the delay period. If these projects fail, given the over-subscription of 
each bid window (Eberhard et al. 2016) there will be projects to take their place; however, there will 
inevitably be additional costs for both the new sponsor and the public stakeholders due to resultant 
reworking required to get such projects up to the relevant project stage. 
5.2.3 STRENGTH OF CONSORTIUM AND APPROPRIATE RISK ALLOCATION AND RISK SHARING CRITICAL SUCCESS 
FACTORS 
The presence of strong project consortiums bidding for projects in the South African PPP market and 
suitable financial conditions to fund the projects are also evidenced by the high number of successful 
projects that have been delivered so far, as detailed above.  The high number of projects delivered so far 
would also indicate that both the public and private sector are comfortable with the risk allocation and 
the levels of risk sharing. Interestingly the South African Treasury PPP guidance documentation 
(National Treasury, 2004c) does not discuss risk allocation and risk sharing; however, despite this lack 
of official guidance, the risk management aspects of the PPP planning and negotiations appears to have 
been done well. This is supported by the survey analysis results which indicated that the Favourable PPP 
Framework critical success factor is functioning well in South Africa.  
5.2.4 IDENTIFICATION OF PROJECTS SUITABLE FOR PPP CONTRACTING CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR 
Identification of projects suitable for PPP contracting is a key PPP success factor and as stated previously, 
the WEF notes that the identification of bankable projects and the associated necessary agreements and 
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processes required to render a project bankable can block many infrastructure developments from 
progressing (World Economic Forum, 2013). Under the legal structure of the REIPPPP preferred bidders 
must enter into a power purchase agreement (PPA) with Eskom, which enables firm revenue projections, 
albeit within the limitations of the technologies selected.  This bankable PPA is one of the main 
requirements to render a project “bankable” or worthy of investment by financiers and is one of the key 
aspects behind the REIPPPP’s success as noted by survey respondents and supported by the Department 
of Energy (2015) report.   
With regard to the South African renewable energy PPP procurement programmes, further similarities 
are shown between the critical success factors identified from the systematic literature review and those 
from the survey responses. These include competitive and transparent procurement, appropriate risk 
allocation and risk sharing and a favourable PPP framework.  It is also noted that although the 
requirements of the South African PPP renewable energy programmes have evolved, these changes have 
been managed so as not to been seen as creating policy uncertainty.  Indeed, these changes have been 
welcomed by all the survey respondents, as they reduce bidding costs and therefore the tariffs which can 
be bid for the projects, which is to the benefit of the South African economy as a whole. 
In addition to the need for greater public commitment, the other critical success factor area identified as 
needing urgent attention is the need to ensure that the PPP framework remains favourable, particularly 
the need for improved consistency of the programmes. PPP contracts are based on private sector 
involvement and the private sector needs regular income streams in order to remain in business.  A 
consequence of this lack of consistency is that although the competitive tendering nature of the South 
African renewable energy PPP procurement programmes has been reducing the costs of technologies, 
such as wind and solar PV (Eberhard & Kaberger, 2016), survey respondents have noted that the political 
and programme uncertainties are forcing them to include a factor of up to 10% in their tariffs to 
accommodate these programme uncertainties. This means that the price reductions that South Africa is 
seeing from the generation of lower and lower bid tariffs, for wind and PV at least, may be reduced, 
although the competitive nature of the auction programme will tend to mitigate this risk to a certain 
extent. 
Other areas which the research identified where the South African renewable energy PPP programmes 
could be improved are that currently the cost of bidding into the programmes is very high and the chances 
of success low, which is a potential deterrent to new bidders and has already resulted in some project 
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developers moving on to other markets in Africa.  However, it was noted by one respondent that this 
high cost does deter “rent seekers” from bidding. In other words, it deters non-serious bidders. While the 
programmes are over-subscribed, as they have been in the initial bid windows (Eberhard et al.2016), the 
highly competitive nature of the programmes works as intended to reduce tariffs.  However, there will 
inevitably be a point at which the tariffs will stabilise and even perhaps increase if the market ceases to 
be competitive. 
Considering the most appropriate model for delivery of utility scale renewable energy projects, Grimsey, 
(2005) has shown that the case for the PPP model improves as projects become larger and more complex. 
Zeegers and Ang (2007) noted that the minimum scale for a PPP project in Holland in 2007 was €25 
million, and Burger and Hawkesworth (2011) reported that in the UK, in 2008, the minimum size project 
for a PPP contracting model to be considered was £20 million. The first round of bids in the REIPPPP, 
which are all now operational, are reported by Eberhard et al. (2014) to have had a total capital investment 
value of almost US$6 billion. This is well in excess of these guidance figures, so in terms of capital 
investment, the PPP model would appear to be appropriate for the programme as a whole.  Reference 
data for the appropriate scale of projects within the programme is not readily available; however, the 
survey respondents believe that the minimum size of project would range from US$3 million up to 
US$100 million.  
5.2.5 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR 
Through analysis of the survey data, Economic Development, an additional critical success factor for 
South African PPP projects is proposed. The importance of economic development as a success factor 
for PPP projects in South Africa is noted by Eberhard et al (2016), as being key to getting the necessary 
political support required for the projects and hence is also a key aspect of the Commitment of Public 
and Private Parties critical success factor. The South African Department of Energy reports that by June 
2015, after the first five bid windows of the REIPPPP, 6,327MW of energy generation had been allocated 
of which 1,827MW were already operational and many of the economic development targets have been 
exceeded. Employment opportunities are greater than expected, with 19,050 job years of employment 
that have been created so far, preferential procurement is as high as 89% whereas the target was 60% and 
socio-economic development spend by projects has reached 2.2% of revenues against a target of 1.5% 
(Department of Energy, n.d.). Although these statistics appear to be excellent, a very valid question was 
raised by one of the survey respondents is whether the high local content requirements, that project 
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developers are now required to adhere to by the PPP programme, are hindering the reduction of electricity 
generation tariffs further. This concern is supported by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).  The OECD notes in its trade policy note dated February 2016 that while local 
content requirements “may help governments achieve certain short-term objectives, they undermine 
long-term industrial competitiveness,” (OECD, 2016). 
Whether or not countries, such as South Africa, include preferential procurement requirements, such as 
the inclusion of minimum levels of local content in the projects, implementation of PPP projects in a 
country is often linked to an increase in GDP, or in other words, the economic development of a country. 
Shediac, Abouchakra, Hammami, and Najjar (2008) observe that “analyses show that a 1% increase in 
PPP investment will increase  GDP per capita by 0.3%, implying that consistent investment in PPPs will 
increase GDP levels sizably.” This is supported by the observation that countries which invested in 70 
or more PPP projects between 1990 and 2003 achieved a growth rate of 25% (Shediac et al., 2008). 
5.2.6 CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The analysis identified that certain areas of the South African energy projects PPP programmes are in 
need of improvement if they are to remain successful. The two critical success factors identified which 
are in need of improvement are the Effective Governance critical success factor and the Commitment of 
Public and Private Parties critical success factor. Other areas for improvement identified by the analysis 
relate to the design of the South African renewable energy PPP programmes, as well as to the 
effectiveness of certain aspects of the renewable energy PPP industry.  The introduction of time of use 
tariffs is suggested, as is the introduction of grid scale energy storage.  The separation of the electricity 
grid operator from the electricity generation assets is also suggested as a means to reduce the conflict of 
interest that Eskom finds itself in currently. Improvements in the design of the financial aspects of the 
programme are suggested in order to enhance its effectiveness, as are the need to find ways to reduce the 
cost of the legal services required by the project developers. While the level of oversight during the 
projects operations stage and associated reporting by the project operators is noted as being a burden it 
is also noted by other respondents as being necessary given the public sector involvement in the projects.  
This aligns with the transparency critical success factor identified by the research. 
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5.2.7 INTERVENTIONS TO IMPROVE THE CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS IN ORDER TO INCREASE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
The analysis undertaken and summarised in Chapter 4 identified that work is required in a number of 
areas to improve the delivery of PPP projects in the energy sector in South Africa and hence increase the 
level of economic development of the country. The analysis undertaken has identified four interventions, 
whose implementation would help to improve the critical success factors that are failing. The 
interventions are: 
1. Review the barriers and opportunities to reduce project cost of finance of PPP projects in South 
Africa and hence improve the critical success factor, “Suitable Financial Conditions”. 
2. Undertake root cause analysis to understand the reasons for lack of commitment for the critical 
success factor, “Commitment of Public and Private Parties”. 
3. Undertake regular reviews to ensure PPP framework remains favourable to both public and 
private parties and hence improve the “Favourable PPP Framework” critical success factor. 
4. Review the barriers and opportunities to increase local content of projects, which acts directly on 
the control variable, “Economic Development”. 
Support for the proposed interventions is as follows. 
Undertake root cause analysis to understand the reasons for the lack of commitment for the critical 
success factor, “Commitment of Public and Private Parties”. With Eskom refusing to sign PPAs there 
is clearly a problem with the commitment of the public parties to the PPP programme. As noted by Le 
Cordeur (2017), this is a multi-faceted problem involving not only Eskom but also trade unions. It is 
therefore proposed that as a first step to resolving this problem a root cause analysis of this problem is 
undertaken.  This will enable an improved understanding of the problem, which will hopefully lead to 
the development of possible resolutions. 
Review barriers and opportunities to reduce the cost of finance of the PPP projects in South Africa. 
Whether a PPP framework will be successful depends to a large extent on whether the private sector can 
make adequate financial returns to meet the requirements of their shareholders, while keeping the projects 
to a price that is acceptable to the public sector (Love et al., 2000). Hence the causal loop diagram 
developed shows the variable Suitable Financial Conditions as being key to the success of the Favourable 
PPP Framework variable. Nelson and Shrimali (2014) indicates that in developing countries the cost of 
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finance of renewable energy projects, such as wind and solar projects can add between 24% and 32% to 
the cost of projects.  The intervention identified is therefore a key consideration to improve the viability 
of PPP projects in South Africa, as the causal loop diagram developed indicates that if increased numbers 
of suitable projects can be identified and implemented then the levels of economic development will rise. 
Undertake regular reviews of the PPP framework in order to ensure that it remains favourable to 
both the public and private parties. All development programmes should be regularly reviewed and 
revised as required, in order to ensure that all aspects are optimised as far as possible given changes in 
technology development, costs, risks and the needs which the programme is intending to fulfil, to name 
but a few.  This is supported by various of the survey responses. Therefore, one of the interventions 
identified is to undertake regular reviews of the PPP framework in order to ensure that it remains 
favourable to both the public and private parties. 
Review barriers and opportunities to increase local content of projects. As noted by Eberhard and 
Kaberger (2016), increasing the level of economic development of the country is key to maintaining 
political support for South African energy PPP programmes.  Hence one of the interventions proposed is 
to undertake a holistic review of the barriers and opportunities for increasing the level of economic 
development associated with the development of PPP projects in South Africa, while minimising any 
long term impacts on the competitiveness of the country (OECD, 2016).   
5.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The South African PPP industry plays an important part in the South African economy through its ability 
to attract significant quantities of foreign investment into the country, as indicated by Eberhard et al. 
(2014). This research can assist with the work necessary to further develop the South African PPP 
industry and thereby maintain or even increase these levels of international investment. 
Although survey responses were received from respondents working across the energy sectors, this 
research study was limited due to the number of survey responses received. The research thus could be 
enhanced through increasing the number of respondents to the survey. The receipt of additional responses 
would add further diversity to the responses received as well as provide a better indication of any trends 
in this particular market sector.   
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The interventions identified in the analysis will help to improve the performance of the failing critical 
success factors. However, further research will be required to determine whether the interventions are 
sufficient.  The interventions identified are not simple actions, but rather packages of work that will in 
themselves result in further actions, which will in turn need to be implemented if the interventions are to 
be fully successful. Given the complex and dynamic nature of the problem it is likely that ongoing 
research and regular interventions will be required for South African PPP projects to continue to be 
successful. 
An aspect of the research that has not been included in this study, is the concept of the level of maturity 
of each of the critical success factors identified. While critical success factors indicate the areas that need 
to be concentrated on to ensure success of PPP projects, the readiness of the relevant stakeholders to 
successfully deliver PPP projects can be shown by the level of maturity of each critical success factor 
(Babatunde et al.2015). This would be particularly pertinent to countries, such as South Africa, where it 
would be particularly beneficial to assess the maturity levels of the Commitment of Public and Private 
Partners critical success factor which was identified as being a key area where the South African 
renewable energy PPP programmes are failing, in order to gain further insight into the reasons for these 
failings and what might be possible to be done to improve the situation.  
Another aspect that was outside the scope of this research study is whether the PPP model is the best 
vehicle for the delivery of the economic development obligations placed on the renewable energy PPP 
project developers.  Further research should be undertaken to address whether the price being paid for 
the level of economic obligations is worth the increased electricity tariffs that result, or whether these 
economic development gains can be better provided using other tools and processes. 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The international sources have shown that there are eight critical success factors associated with 
successful PPP projects globally of which four are particularly appropriate for the South African context, 
which are the Commitment of Public and Private Parties, Effective Governance, Favourable PPP 
Framework and Appropriate Risk Allocation and Risk Sharing.  An additional critical success factor for 
the South African context has also been identified, which is Economic Development. The research shows 
that while the PPP programme developed to deliver energy projects in South Africa met all four of the 
international factors relevant to South Africa, work is required in two of these areas to ensure that the 
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programme remains successful, the Effective Governance critical success factor and the Commitment of 
Public and Private Parties critical success factor. 
The analysis undertaken has identified four possible interventions, whose implementation will improve 
the development of PPP projects in South Africa.  The implementation of these interventions will need 
to be monitored in order to confirm whether they are sufficient or whether additional implementations 
are required.  
Further research on possible interventions to improve PPP project implementation in South Africa would 
be beneficial as would extending the scope of the current research to consider the maturity of the critical 
success factors identified. The reasons for failures of the critical success factors and the interventions 
that can be put in place to minimise such failures could be further expanded. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research study was undertaken to answer the questions, “What are the key factors that influence the 
outcome of energy projects procured using public private partnerships in South Africa?” and “What 
interventions could improve the success rates of projects procured using public private partnership 
contracts in South Africa?”. The research has identified nine critical success factors which influence 
whether or not a Public Private Partnership energy project will be successful, eight of which are relevant 
to international Public Private Partnership projects and one factor that is particularly relevant to South 
African projects.  
This research indicates that the South African renewable energy PPP project development programmes, 
the REIPPP and the IPP Small Projects programmes have been designed in line with international best 
practice, with all projects awarded in the initial bidding rounds of the REIPPPP, which was started prior 
to the IPP Small Projects Programme, meeting these critical success factors.  These projects have been 
delivered successfully and appear to be providing value for money. Initially at least, the South African 
renewable energy PPP programmes appear to be meeting all of the critical success factors identified. 
However, the research undertaken also indicates that since Round 3 of the REIPPPP, and the 
commencement of the IPP Small Projects Programme, two of the critical success factors, Effective 
Governance and Commitment of Public and Private Parties, are not being met so well.  This is due to the 
levels of commitment by the public sector partners diminishing in key areas such as the political 
uncertainty regarding the energy projects PPP programmes, signing of project PPAs by Eskom and the 
announcements of preferred bidders by the Department of Energy, which have been significantly delayed 
in both cases. The risks resulting from these critical success factors not being met can manifest in the 
form of project failures, particularly where the project sponsors do not have the financial backing to 
absorb the delays and continue with the projects. While additional projects may be available to take the 
failed project’s allocated generation capacity, this will result in additional costs for both the public and 
private sector stakeholders.   
Other results of the delays, as well as the high cost of bidding and low success rates, have been the exiting 
of the South African PPP renewable energy market by some developers, which are now seeing other 
markets, such as in various other African countries, being more attractive, as well as the deterrence of 
some potential bidders from bidding into the South African programmes. While there are sufficient 
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developers in the market to ensure that each bid window is over-subscribed then the aims of the 
programmes should be met, assuming the projects reach financial close and construction proceeds as 
planned.  However, care should be taken to ensure that the programmes remain sufficiently attractive to 
project developers to ensure that the competitive structure of the programme works as intended and the 
trend of steadily reducing tariffs is not reversed. 
In addition to meeting the critical success factors identified by the research for projects internationally, 
a measure of the level of success of the South African PPP energy projects is the level of economic 
development achieved, which is key to getting the necessary political support required for compliance 
with aspects of the Commitment of Public and Private Partners critical success factor. This is the ninth 
critical success factor identified, which is of particular importance when developing PPP projects in 
developing countries, such as South Africa.  
A number of interventions were identified by the research, which would help improve the critical success 
factors which are failing and in so doing increase the level of economic development associated with 
undertaking PPP projects in South Africa. The interventions identified range from undertaking root cause 
analyses to identify the reasons for the lack of public sector commitment to reviewing barriers and 
opportunities to increasing project local content requirements and reducing project financing costs, to the 
undertaking of regular reviews in order to ensure that the PPP framework remains favourable to both 
public and private parties.  
Analysis of the critical success factors has shown that improvements in some factors will be more 
effective at improving the level of economic development in South Africa than improvements in others. 
In other words, interventions made to certain factors will have more leverage than when made to other 
factors. In order to maximise the effectiveness of the interventions, it was identified that they should be 
aimed at the Commitment of Public and Private Parties critical success factor, the Favourable PPP 
Framework critical success factor and the Suitable Financial Conditions critical success factor, as these 
are the three factors identified as having the most leverage to improve the level of economic development 
in South Africa.  
Opportunities exist to expand this research through further study and increasing the number of survey 
responses as well as broadening the pool of industry professionals that respond.  The utility of this 
research could therefore be improved through getting a larger number of survey responses from a broader 
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spectrum of individuals involved in the energy industry.  This study provides the preliminary work for 
further research such as undertaking an assessment of the level of maturity of the critical success factors 
identified for the South African renewable energy PPP programmes, would provide further details of the 
aspects of the critical success factors that are being successfully met and those that require further work.  
The learnings from this research will be of benefit to the body of knowledge surrounding the development 
and execution of PPP energy projects in South Africa and other developing countries. 
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Informed Consent Form 
Name of researcher: 
Justin Wimbush 
 
Title of research project:  
Project procurement in developing countries: a case study in the use of public private partnerships for development of 
energy infrastructure projects in South Africa 
By filling out this questionnaire / answering the questions put to me: 
• I agree to participate in this research project. 
• I have read this consent form and the information it contains and had the opportunity to ask questions about them. 
• I agree to my responses being used for education and research on condition my privacy is respected, subject to the 
following: - (tick as appropriate) 
 
 Yes No 
My name may be used in the published research   
My personal details (e.g. age, occupation, position) may be included in the published research   
My responses can only be used in a way that I cannot be personally identifiable   
I would like a copy of the final research paper   
 
• I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in this project. 
• I understand I have the right to withdraw from this project at any stage. 
• I understand that this research might be published in a research journal or book. In the case of dissertation research, 
the document will be available to readers in a university library in printed form, and possibly in electronic form as 
well. 
Name of Participant  
(or Guardian if participant is under 18) :  
Date :  
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and how the information will be used and explains what your participation in the research involves (e.g. how long it will take, 
participants’ roles and rights (including the right to skip questions or withdraw without penalty at any time), any anticipated 
risks/benefits which may arise as a result of participating, any costs or payment involved (even if none, these should be stated)) 
Has this been provided? Yes  No  
Have your received verbal confirmation/explanations where needed? Yes  No  
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APPENDIX 2 – SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
South African Renewable Energy Procurement - Room for 
Improvement? 
Thank you for your time taken to complete this questionnaire, the data from which will feed into my 
dissertation for my master's degree in Engineering Management from the University of Cape Town, in 
which I am investigating the use of Public Private Partnership Contracting for Renewable Energy 
Projects in South Africa.  Your answers to the questions below will help to identify the key factors that 
influence the outcome of energy projects procured using public private procurement contracting forms.   
Thank you again for your time in assisting me with this work. 
By completing this form: 
• It is assumed that you agree to participate in this research project. 
• It is assumed that you agree to your responses being used for education and research on condition 
your privacy is respected, subject to the responses to questions 1 and 2. 
• It is assumed that you understand that this research might be published in a research journal or 
book. In the case of dissertation research, the document will be available to readers in a university library 
in printed form, and possibly in electronic form as well. 
 
1. Please confirm whether your name can be used in the published research 
 
2. Please confirm if your responses can only be used in a way that you cannot be personally 
identifiable 
 
3. Please confirm if you would like a copy of the final research paper 
 
4. What are the key factors that you perceive are behind the success of the REIPPP programme? 
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5. Are there particular aspects of the REIPPP programme that could be improved? 
 
6. What is the minimum size of project that is appropriate for auction systems, such as the REIPPP 
programme, in US$? 
 
7. Which aspects, if any, that are used in other programmes internationally should be considered 
for future bid windows of the REIPPP? 
 
8. It is noted that the delays in preferred bidder announcements and extensions of financial close 
dates cause economic uncertainty for developers and investors.  What level of premium do you 
add to your tariff to compensate for delays in announcement of preferred bidders and financial 
close? 
 
9. Given the high level of competitiveness of the wind and solar aspects of the REIPPP 
programme and hence the low success rates, could the high cost of bidding could be seen by 
some as a deterrence to potential bidders? 
 
10. Is the level of oversight of the projects during the construction and operation stages, that 
required by the DoE, appropriate for PPP projects of this scale? 
 
11. In contrast to the initial Bid Windows, the DoE adjusted the bid requirements for later bid 
windows such that developers did not need to have a confirmed lender and EPC confirmed prior 
to bid submission.  Please could you comment on the consequences of this change, including 
whether this reduced bidding costs; enabled some developers to submit “low ball” bids that risk 
not being able to reach financial close; and whether this change enable developers to agree 
better terms with both lenders and EPCs since terms would only be agreed once the developers 
are confirmed as preferred bidders. 
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12. Given the rules and requirements of the REIPPP programme and / or the SPIPPs programme 
what are the non-government or Eskom related key factors that determine whether a project will 
be delivered successfully? 
 
13. Are there areas where the South African renewable energy industry (finance, legal, consultants, 
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APPENDIX 6 – SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW THEMATIC ANALYSIS RESULTS 














Good governance is a PPP critical 
success factor in Malaysia 
Corruption avoidance, 
honouring of the 
contractual agreements by 
all parties, independence of 
courts 
Effective Governance 
Higher standards of governance in 
government e.g. control of 
corruption are important in getting 
private parties to enter the market 
Effective governance is key to 
success 
Extent of lack of independence of 
the courts can present a risk to PPP 
investments 
Corruption eradication is a PPP 
critical success factor in Indonesia. 
Matters related to the alignment of 
Malaysia’s PPP/PFI developments 
with the public interest. 
Importance of credibility in the 
government’s efforts as well as 
promises of change in the system 
that includes the need for greater 
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Strength of consortium is a PPP 
critical success factor in Ghana 
Experienced private and 
public project partners, 
skilled project parties, 
strength of consortium 
Strength of Consortium 
Strong and good private 
consortium is a critical success 
factor in Hong Kong, the UK & 
Australia 
Project partnership needs sufficient 
expertise to deliver high quality 
services 
Strong and good private 
consortium is not ranked highly as 
a critical success factor in China as 
there are many other risks that 
could disrupt a PPP project. 
Strong and good private 
consortium is a PPP critical 
success factor in Hong Kong 
Possible project failure 
mechanisms: 
1. Hastily prepared tender docs 
and contracts 
2. Negotiations taking place 
between unequally qualified and 
experienced professionals 
Negative aspects, relating to 
factors such as the inexperience of 
the participants, the over-
commercialisation of projects, and 
high participation cost and time, 
make PPP/PFI procurement less 
attractive. 
Critical success factors used to 
develop a 5 level framework for 
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TABLE 8: THEMATIC ANALYSIS PROCESS – FAVOURABLE PPP FRAMEWORK CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR 
Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
Govt programmes eg feedin tariffs 
essential for private sector 
participation in PPPs 
→ 




→ Favourable PPP Framework 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- favourable framework 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- reliable concession agreement 
China PPP critical success factor - 
favourable legal framework 
HK PPP critical success factor - 
favourable legal framework 
Favourable legal framework and 
stable macro-economic conditions 
are well developed in UK and Aus 
so given less importance by 
respondents 
HK PPP critical success factor - 
favourable legal framework 
Malaysia PPP critical success 
factor - favourable legal 
framework 
Sydney Superdome critical success 
factor - streamlined approvals and 
legislation 
Lebanon PPP critical success 
factor - sound legal and regulatory 
framework 
Ghana PPP critical success factor - 
favourable and efficient legal 
framework 
Indonesia PPP critical success 
factor - an irrevocable contract 
Indonesia PPP critical success 
factor - a sound legal basis 
Specific legal frameworks are 
essential to attract private 
investment 
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Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
problems in policy formulation 
and implementation, as well as 
with corruption, supervision and a 
lack of access to investment 
capital, have affected PPP 
growth 
few countries have the highly 
sophisticated legal frameworks and 
institutional capacity necessary to 
carry out PPPs — important 
preconditions for attracting private 
sector investment (Koppenjan and 
Enserink, 2009) 
Top ranked critical success factor 
in both China and Hong Kong was 
"Favourable legal framework". 
PPP critical success factor - there 
must be clear lines of 
accountability and redress 
Recommends inclusion of a 
renegotiation clause to allow the 
contract to be revised to account 
for changes in long term trends so 
as to maximise public benefits - 
this requires much care as 
renegotiation clauses can lead to 
failure of contracts. 
Suggests the inclusion of "Put and 
Call" options to increase flexibility 
of contracting while avoiding 
opportunism in negotiations by 
either side. 
Possible failure mechanisms: 
1. Hastily prepared tender docs 
and contracts 
2. Negotiations taking place 
between unequally qualified and 
experienced professionals 
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Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
PPP project specifications must be 
carefully considered and due to the 
length of the contract they must 
consider how changes in the future 
will be taken into account.  A five 
step systematic process for 
developing the project 
specifications was developed for 
the project. 
As the risk of regulatory 
opportunism increases, the case for 
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TABLE 9: COMMITMENT OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PARTNERS CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR 
Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- serious commitment with 
adequate tech strength 
→ 
Commitment and 
responsibility of private 
and public sectors, strong 
political support, need for 
public and private sector 
expertise 
→ Commitment of private and 
public sectors 
Ghana PPP critical success factor - 
political environment 
Ghana PPP critical success factor - 
commitment of partners 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- political support 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- strong political will with 
commited private sector partners 
HK, UK & AUS PPP critical 
success factor - commitment & 
responsibility of public and private 
sectors 
China PPP critical success factor - 
Commitment and responsibility of 
public and private sectors 
HK PPP critical success factor - 
Commitment and responsibility of 
public and private sectors 
Malaysia PPP critical success 
factor - commitment of public and 
private sectors 
Indonesia PPP critical success 
factor - strong political support 
To maintain the cost efficiencies of 
PPPs, governments must honor the 
long time frames of the 
concessions. 
One of success factors in Canadian 
PPPs is the public sector 
maintaining a strong role in 
owning the asset, designing 
project specifications, and 
ensuring public control related to 
key features of their long-term 
operations 
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Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
Indonesia PPP critical success 
factor - policy continuity 
Lebanon PPP critical success 
factor - strong administration to 
guide legislation provision 
Ghana PPP critical success factor - 
National PPP unit 
REIPPPP also highlights the need 
for effective program champions 
with the credibility to interact 
convincingly with senior 
government officials, effectively 
explain the program to 
stakeholders, and communicate 
and negotiate with the private 
sector 
PPP critical success factor - public 
sector must have sufficient 
expertise 
Possible failure mechanisms: 
1. Negotiations taking place 
between unequally qualified and 
experienced professionals 
Availability of sophisticated 
advisory services was critical to 
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TABLE 10: COMPETENT AND TRANSPARENT PROCUREMENT CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR 
Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
Nigeria PPP critical success 





value for money 
→ Competent and transparent 
procurement 
Nigeria PPP critical success 
factor - thorough and realistic 
assessment of costs 
Ghana PPP critical success factor 
- competitive and transparent 
procurement process 
Indonesia PPP critical success 
factor - financial transparency 
Value for money calculation 
requires a government 
comparitor calculation 
Areas for improvement in 
South American 
implementation programmes 
are access to credit and 
transparency and clarity of the 
processes. 
Critical success factor - minimum 
no. bidders required to avoid 
collusion 
private sponsors and financiers 
are more than willing to invest 
in renewable energy if the 
procurement process is well 
designed and transparent with a 
clear procurement framework 
In markets with few major 
players / bidders extra care 
must be taken to ensure 
collusion is avoided and 
competitive tendering is 
achieved. 
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Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
Multiple bid winners is an 
important incentive for the 
private sector to participate in 
the REIPPP. 
Requirement in bid windows 1-
3 for bids to be fully 
underwritten with debt and 
equity almost eliminated the 
risk that competitive bidding 
has in under-bidding to win 
contracts. 
To incentivise bidders through 
providing a reasonable chance 
of success, usually a max of 3 
parties invited to bid. 
High bid costs bias against 
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TABLE 11: SUITABLE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR 
Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- favourable economic 
environment 
→ 
Availability of finance, 
stable macroeconomic 
conditions 
→ Suitable financial conditions 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- stable macroeconomic conditions 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- sound economic policy 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- availability of suitable financial 
market 
Malaysia PPP critical success 
factor - sound economic policy 
Malaysia PPP critical success 
factor - available finance market 
HK PPP critical success factor - 
stable macroeconomic conditions 
China PPP critical success factor - 
Stable macro-economic conditions. 
Lebanon PPP critical success 
factor - financial accountability 
and transparency 
Sydney Superdome critical success 
factor - streamlined finance 
process 
HK PPP critical success factor - 
Stable macro-economic conditions. 
China PPP critical success factor - 
available financial market 
Ghana PPP critical success factor -
Stable macroeconomic conditions 
and sound economic policy 
Ghana PPP critical success factor - 
Available strong and resilient 
financial market. 
Ranked highly in China due to 
financial restrictions was 
"available financial market". 
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TABLE 12: APPROPRIATE RISK ALLOCATION AND RISK SHARING CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR 
Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
China PPP critical success factor - 
appropriate risk allocation and risk 
sharing 
→ 
Key risks mitigated by 
governments, appropriate 
risk allocation and risk 
sharing 
→ Appropriate risk allocation and 
risk sharing 
HK PPP critical success factor - 
appropriate risk allocation and risk 
sharing 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- appropriate risk allocation and 
risk sharing 
HK, UK & AUS PPP critical 
success factor - appropriate risk 
allocation and risk sharing 
Indonesia PPP critical success 
factor - sensible and manageable 
risk sharing arrangements 
PPPs where public and private 
sectors involved in all phases of 
project are more attractive to 
private sector since the risks are 
shared by government. 
The need for contract 
renegotiations when user demand 
is not met is avoided in Canada 
where guaranteed availability 
payments were used instead of 
user revenues 
PPPs have been proposed as 
mechanisms for cash strapped 
governments to pay for 
infrastructure without taking on 
additional debt (Bovaird, 2004), 
harness private sector expertise in 
facility design and operations 
(Russell et al., 2006), and transfer 
the risk of unexpected cost 
overruns and revenue shortfalls 
from government to the private 
sector (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) 
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Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
private sponsors and financiers are 
more than willing to invest in 
renewable energy if the 
procurement process is well 
designed and transparent with a 
clear procurement framework, 
transactions have reasonable levels 
of profitability, and key risks are 
mitigated by government. 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- govt support with enabling 
legislation 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- govt guarantees 
Ghana PPP critical success factor - 
govt guarantees 
Appropriate risk allocation in PPPs 
requires that governments have the 
expertise to identify all of the 
relevant risks before entering into 
the partnership 
contract. Governments must also 
have the contract management 
skills to ensure that those risks are 
in fact borne by the private sector 
Advantage of PPPs is the 
allocation of plant reliability and 
tech risk to private sector 
China and Hong Kong critical 
success factor: 
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TABLE 13: IDENTIFICATION OF SUITABLE PROJECTS CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR 
Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
Ghana PPP critical success factor - 
asset quality and social support 
→ 
PPPs more suitable for 
certain types of projects, 
need for comprehensive 
feasibility studies, value 
for money 
→ 
Identification of suitable 
projects 
Nigeria PPP critical success factor 
- bankable project with adequate 
stakeholder involvement 
Ghana PPP critical success factor - 
right project identification and 
project tech feasibility 
PPPs must start with a 
comprehensive feasibility study 
and economic evaluation. 
In Holland all projects with value 
of over 25M Euros have to have a 
study to determine whether a PPP 
approach will provide better value. 
Defence services, roads and prison 
PPP project demonstrate 
reasonable efficiency gains 
whereas schools and hospitals 
show minimal gains. 
PPPs are the model of choice in 
Canada for delivering large scale 
infrastructure works. 
PPPs suitable for sectors where 
added construction value can 
lower over all costs eg water and 
transport.  It is less suitable for 
sectors such as schools, nursing 
homes and IT. 
Bundling project phases and long-
term contracting allow PPPs to 
provide efficient long-term 
incentives and to optimize the 
trade-off between investment and 
maintenance along the life of the 
project. 
PPP advantage increases (in 
absolute terms) with the size and 
complexity of projects. 
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Relevant Factors  Initial Themes  Final Category 
Many countries use Public Sector 
Comparitor calculations to test that 
PPPs will provide value for money 
before going ahead with the PPP. 
As PPP financing costs are higher 
than public debt, the project NPV 
must be lower, brought about by 
more efficient delivery of the 
project. 
This paper compares the value for 
money tests used in many 
countries, including SA and notes 
also that "Provided there is a 
competition, VFM should be 
ensured by competitive tension 
between 
bidders."  It is noted that public 
sector comparitor calculations 
which are used in many countries, 
are highly dependent on the 
assumptions used, such as the 
discount rate. 
In sectors where PPPs have been 
used for some time, VFM 
assessments are often not required. 
To ensure competitive bidding and 
reduce reliance on VFM 
comparitor calculations govts 
should take a systematic and 
strategic view of the markets they 
are operating in and not just focus 
on individual contracts. 
PPP critical success factor - 
requires clear public need 
A criticism of PPPs is that 
privately delivered infrastructure is 
predominantly focused on 
providing ‘premium network’ 
connections in high value 
locations, while less profitable 
geographic regions and project 
types are often overlooked 
Value for money test criticised as 
is NPV based and includes 
subjective factors eg factors 
included for risk transfer. 
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APPENDIX 7 – SURVEY RESPONSES 
Q1 What are the key factors that you perceive are behind the success of the REIPPP programme? 
Q1R1 Consistent market signalling and treatment of the bidders has made the process predictable 
Q1R2 Right tariffs, bankable PPA (government guarantee), large enough size (MW allocations) and predictability 
(number of bidding rounds) 
Q1R3 Its open and transparent process 
Q1R4 1. The appropriate policy environment for private sector investment in public infrastructure (PPP) was in place 
and well tested; 
2. The project director (Karen) has significant experience in facilitation PPP transactions, understanding of the 
bankability requirements, and access to decision makers in government; moreover her character and 
determination gave the investor community confidence that the programme would not fail 
3. World-class transaction advisors were appointed, who brought along international and local best practices 
and experience to the development of the request for proposal and project agreements; 
4. The development of bankable project agreements and government support undertaking, which were tested 
in the market, gave investors and lender confidence; 
5. The shortfall in electricity supply and ineptitude of the national utility in constructing new capacity – resulted 
in strong support from the industrial and business sector; 
6. The initial price caps provided sufficient incentive for investors 
Q1R5 Rigid procurement that is transparent and based on integrity and legislative requirements. The IPP office was 
a decimated champion of the Programme able led by Karen Breytenbach. The non-negotiability of the Project 
documents assisted the process so to the willingness of the South African based Lenders to lend to the projects 
based on the payment commitment of the State under the IA - Eskom liquidity restraints were a concern and 
the payment undertaking was necessary and still needs to be there . The political will to implement REIPPP 
was crucial but the current impasse with the Eskom stance is regrettable and re-kindled political will and 
leadership needs to be demonstrated as a matter of urgency. 
Q1R6 The DoE's commitment to consistent announcement of projects, government and industry support--which 
makes projects bankable with robust PPAs, experienced developers take part--mostly, as well as a robust 
bidding programme which has been thoroughly thought through. 
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Q1R7 The efforts of the IPP office in the early days on the REIPPP 
Q1R8 Focused execution by the IPP Office, definitive policy, timing (load shedding) etc., standardised procurement 
process, utilisation of international and local advisors in the procurement process. 
Q1R9 Open, transparent process with understandable requirements and outcomes. 
Q1R10 Strong government backing from all sources including policy, treasury, willingness to adapt to overcome 
obstacles. 
Q1R11 Rolling rounds and the initial tariff caps 
Q1R12 Strong SA government commitment to the REIPPP programme from the DoE and IPP Office, the use of world 
class consultants with good local and international experience, engaging with Sponsors and Lenders in the 
design of the programme, and strong programme management to ensure that Financial Close is reached on 
projects within a reasonable time period of the stated dates for Financial Close, as well as continuity of the 
programme via the respective bidding rounds. 
 
Q2 Are there particular aspects of the REIPPP programme that could be improved? 
Q2R1 As difficult as it is, the framework needs to be absolutely clear on timelines and those timelines should remain 
sacrosanct. If not, it gives the impression that the politicians are attempting to influence the decision making 
process and that is the wrong signal to be sending out after such success. 
Q2R2 Predictability and timing 
Q2R3 The time and the costs of getting projects to financial close can be reduced. 
The current political uncertainty should be addressed head on to provide all participants with confidence in the 
programme. 
Q2R4 No comment. 
Q2R5 The market is familiar with the Programme. Deals are unfortunate and damage the integrity of the overall 
Programme. Political commitment must be clearly demonstrated with concrete actions as a matter of urgency 
- capital thrives in certainty and is a coward in an uncertain environment. RE is driving the new energy 
economy and consequences flowing from been interrupt able can be and will be addressed by storage, use of 
Interconnectors and demand side management   programmes. Regular and consistent communication is 
important and inter acting state entries need to be aligned and Disruptors brought into line - grand standing in 
public media must be curtailed. 
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Q2R6 The interface with Eskom (e.g. better coordination between Cost Estimate Letter and Budget Quote, more 
defined process in getting Budget Quotes signed, etc.). Also, allowance for time-of-generation tariffs (as is 
included with CSP projects) would open the door for grid-level storage and make renewables a valuable player 
in easing stress during peak load times. Aspects that would reduce bidding costs could also be discussed--
which would open the door to smaller and local developers to take part as the SPIPPPs have not really proved 
to be very successful at a reasonable cost (costs are still quite high). 
Q2R7 Policy support and interface with Eskom 
Q2R8 Communication of bid windows and timing. 
Bidding cost can be reduced to increase the market participation. 
Q2R9 Fixed and dedicated timelines that does not move (i.e. announcement of Preferred bidder, period for reaching 
FC etc.) 
Q2R10 Yes, a more defined and strict program where windows are announced, tendered and adjudicated in a consistent 
manner. Technology allocations should be adapted/increased/decreased each window to evolve with the 
market along with the IRP. This would ensure the country's procurement program offers the consumers/tax 
payers the optimum power generation infrastructure to suit the current demand. Time of generation tariffs 
should be introduced to encourage storage and other technologies a more cost reflective payment profile 
thereby advancing the technology learning which reduces costs and intermittency. 
Q2R11 More consistent timing and adhering to set times. 
Q2R12 The management of timelines to financial close and the involvement and the continued commitment of key 
government departments and state owned companies (such as Eskom) could be improved. 
 
Q3 What is the minimum size of project that is appropriate for auction systems, such as the REIPPP 
programme, in US$? 
Q3R1 $25 million 
Q3R2 $3 million 
Q3R3 R200m ($15m) 
Q3R4 The minimum size of project is really determined by transactional costs – lower that USD 65 million would 
not be feasible. 
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Q3R5 The distinction between the REIPPP and small REIPPP appears to be technically correct. The financing of the 
small Programme needs to be co-ordinated through the DFIs to ensue simplicity and competitive funding 
terms. 
Q3R6 My opinion is that it should be 10MW(ac) minimum to provide sufficient scale. This will allow financial room 
for all advisors to be involved in sufficient detail to ensure a good, bankable and technically excellent project. 
Q3R7 It depends on the technology and the procurement requirements or goals of procurement (e.g. cheapest price 
or industrial enhancement). 
Q3R8 $5 million 
Q3R9 Minimum size is irrelevant, this should be left up to the bidder, the cost input would naturally push the 
minimum size up. 
Q3R10 Ideally here should be no minimum size as the market should dictate the optimum size and hence lowest cost 
to consumer however this does have set backs. Smaller projects offer better competition through more industry 
players, greater local job creation per MW, smaller upfront costs for new entrepreneurs leading to increased 
SME's, smaller upstream grid requirements, improved distribution of projects and grid impacts etc. 
Q3R11 There is no minimum size requirement as a smaller project can have a lower grid connection and capex price 
thereby making it more competitive. 
Q3R12 I think the minimum size would be US$100m. 
 
Q4 Which aspects, if any, that are used in other programmes internationally should be considered for future 
bid windows of the REIPPP? 
Q4R1 Alternative sources of revenue such as carbon credits to be generated and traded as part of the local 
commitment to climate change. 
Q4R2 Don't know other programmes. 
Q4R3 None that I know of. 
Q4R4 I think aspects of the government support (implementation agreement) can be reduce or eliminate. In many 
first-world jurisdiction, no government support is provide and investors are willing to take the risk. 
Q4R5 The REIPPP is customized to suit the SA environment while EDO initiatives are to be applauded, localization 
must not impede advantages in the global market to further reduce tariffs. 
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Q4R6 Time-of-generation tariffs, which would open the door for grid level storage. I also think that allowance for 
multi-contracting (as opposed to only one main EPC) would allow for better pricing. 
Q4R7 Pre-qualification of developers (based on development and financing experience) rather than specific projects. 
Q4R8 No comment. 
Q4R9 Fixed timelines and more information sharing upfront. 
Q4R10 Time of Generation tariff, regional scaling to levelise the radiation / grid congestion, separate grid operator 
from the generation assets to remove the conflict of interest the country is currently experiencing. 
Q4R11 None. 
Q4R12 Potentially, the DoE should consider adjusting all of the key financial variables at financial close of the projects 
(namely, interest rate swaps and the real reference rate on CPI linked debt), not just adjusting the foreign 
exchange rates at Financial Close. 
 
Q5 It is noted that the delays in preferred bidder announcements and extensions of financial close dates 
cause economic uncertainty for developers and investors. What level of premium do you add to your 
tariff to compensate for delays in announcement of preferred bidders and financial close? 
Q4R1 In our case, the premium would be an added percentage to the IRR of 5%. 
Q4R2 N/A as hydro projects bid at max tariff, but I should say 10%. 
Q4R3 N/A participate as long term lenders so interested in the long term interest rate on the senior debt facilities. 
Delays do make it very difficult to allocate capital to the projects however. 
Q4R4 Agreed that confidence is affected by uncertainty and delays. However, one must understand the underlying 
reasons for the delays. With regards to the announcement of preferred bidders – more time was required than 
expected to obtain ministerial approval of the contingent liability obligations of government, as well as co-
operations from other organ of state – notable the national utility. With regards to financial close – the 
government does not control financial close. In the first rounds, government wanted to co-ordinate 
simultaneous commercial close on all the projects in the round. However, most preferred bidders and their 
lenders were not ready. Therefore, more time was allow for preferred bidders and their lenders to finalise their 
projects. To suggest there should be a pricing premium is nonsensical, as bidder are fairly compensation for 
market movements between bid submission and commercial close. 
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Q4R5 Delays cause uncertainty which increases the risk as well as cost of the project.  The ability of EPC contractors 
to hold prices firm for protracted periods is difficult. There must be a form of a stabilization mechanism 
available to maintain the economics of the bid project - financiers are best placed to advise. The difficulties 
between cost estimate letters and budget quotes are regrettable and seriously undermine the economics of the 
project. Eskom stance is regrettable both from a costing and timing perspective plus unwarranted requests for 
information from bidders are wrong - the DOE and IPP office need to engage Eskom urgently on the Eskom 
approach to these issues - the determinations under a Section 34 of the ERA have been made and must be 
implemented - No part should have the ability to rail road the process. 
Q4R6 As technical advisors, we do not add premiums to our costs--as we indicate to possible clients that our fee will 
increase every year, in line with CPI. As far as developers and EPCs are concerned we've heard that allowance 
is made, deemed to be sufficient for possible delays.   
Q4R7 Zero.  Adding any premium results in being non-competitive.   
Q4R8 No comment. 
Q4R9 I cannot comment as I have zero visibility on Tariff. 
Q4R10 This is a fundamental flaw of the REIPPP as a prudent developer/tenderer you optimise your project and tariff 
on the basis of the time frames provided. If you add uncertainty premiums you directly affect the 
competitiveness of your offer which is unfairly passed onto the consumer. A more rigid program would negate 
this. 
Q4R11 None. 
Q4R12 This question will need to be asked of the Sponsors and Preferred Bidders, but as a Lender i think that a buffer 
or tariff premium is needed to compensate the projects for the extensive delays experienced on REIPPP 
projects in South Africa. 
 
Q5 Given the high level of competitiveness of the wind and solar aspects of the REIPPP programme and 
hence the low success rates, could the high cost of bidding could be seen by some as a deterrence to 
potential bidders? 
Q5R1 100% correct. 
Q5R2 We've been able to manage the direct cost of bidding internally. Then it is not so high. Bidding using only 
advisors with no internal resources can be expensive. 
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Q5R3 Absolutely. I think many potential bidders have already moved on from REIPPPP due to the cost of bidding 
(and now the political uncertainty) and are looking to off-grid and other African opportunities. 
Q5R4 Definitely. Bidders have to trade-off bidding risk and reward (returns). In the first round there were no capacity 
ceiling and all bidders submitted prices at or close to the ceiling price, thus, all qualified bidders (those that 
passed the technical, financial, legal and BEE criteria) we appointed as preferred bidders. In the second round 
capacity ceiling were introduced to drive competition, resulting in only the cheapest bids within the cap being 
awarded. Competition has the desirable effect of eliminating “rent-seeker”. Thus rent-seeker are deterred from 
bidding. 
Q5R5 I am not aware of this issue. We must realize that our REIPPP projects will compete with other global 
Programmes. 
Q5R6 Yes, certainly, especially for smaller (and mainly local) developers. Smaller and starting developers cannot 
hang around for a long time while announcements are delayed and delayed again--without some other form of 
revenue. 
Q5R7 Yes, but it is also a barrier to entry that excludes 'cowboys' from entering the process. 
Q5R8 Yes it could. 
Q5R9 Yes. 
Q5R10 Most definitely, developing projects to be tender ready is extremely capital intensive and high risk. Small 
developers or IPP's would struggle to remain afloat after one or two failed windows and we have directly seen 
this happening too many competent SME's who narrowly missed awards that were swallowed by larger 
internationals. We as a small local development company was lucky to have been awarded RD1 and RD3 
projects as it would be very difficult to see our doors open had it not been for these early successes. 
Q5R11 Yes 
Q5R12 Yes indeed, and that is why i think that some bidders have decided to go and compete in other African 
renewable energy markets. 
 
Q6 Is the level of oversight of the projects during the construction and operation stages, that required by 
the DoE, appropriate for PPP projects of this scale? 
Q6R1 Yes 
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Q6R2 Construction OK, but far too high a level of oversight required in operational stage. We are delivering 
generation data to 3 different entities at a level of detail that no one apart from researchers would want to look 
at. 
Q6R3 Yes 
Q6R4 Oversight is always required when government is buying a service or commodity, to ensure that tax-payers (or 
electricity consumers in this case) are receiving best value for money. Without the oversight, project owner 
can easily become squatters, tying up supply capacity without delivery energy. Given the desperate need for 
supply capacity, this situation could not be afforded by the economy. 
Q6R5 The oversight by the LTA is more critical in my view .the role of Eskom in the connection component via its 
role as the Gris secretariat is an inherent conflict which needs to be addressed. 
Q6R6 Yes, in my opinion. 
Q6R7 Yes 
Q6R8 Yes 
Q6R9 Yes, the Independent Engineer role fits well into these projects. 
Q6R10 Yes, the projects should be seen as a country asset and investment and should be closely monitored throughout 
the projects life on the country's behalf. 
Q6R11 Yes 
Q6R12 Yes i still think that this level of oversight and project monitoring is appropriate for PPP projects of this scale, 
as the economic development obligations of the REIPPP Programme are very important to the South African 
government and its people. 
 
Q7 In contrast to the initial Bid Windows, the DoE adjusted the bid requirements for later bid windows 
such that developers did not need to have a confirmed lender and EPC confirmed prior to bid 
submission. Please could you comment on the consequences of this change, including whether this 
reduced bidding costs; enabled some developers to submit “low ball” bids that risk not being able to 
reach financial close; and whether this change enable developers to agree better terms with both lenders 
and EPCs since terms would only be agreed once the developers are confirmed as preferred bidders. 
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Q7R1 This enabled the tariff to be reduced at the cost of potentially losing one idiot bidder, who in turn would risk 
their bid guarantee. The risk to the DOE of the single loss of bidder is worth the success of the strategy to 
reduce the tariff 
Q7R2 It does create some risk for gaming the bid process, but acknowledges that there are always structure changes 
post preferred bidder, so overall good. 
Q7R3 As a lender, this is a much better position as it enables us to provide support to more projects as the time and 
costs related to the DD is no longer required to be incurred. 
Q7R4 All of the about are true, the intent was to reduce bidding cost, simulate more competition and thus reduce 
prices. It is a gamble, in that awarded projects might not reach financial close. However, long-stop provision 
protect government in this regard. Moreover, the supply constraints are not as tight. Consequently, the 
relaxation of requirements has been beneficial to tax-payers. 
Q7R5 No comment. 
Q7R6 I do believe this approach reduced bidding costs, even though EPC contractors do not usually charge to provide 
a cost to be part of a project. Lenders require audited documentation if they are to support a project and this 
would reduce cost if not required. On the other hand, since EPCs don't have to provide a cost pre-bid, 
consultants are now asked to provide prices and typically they inflate costs to allow for unknowns--which may 
inflate a bidding price. This approach may allow more time to properly negotiate with EPCs and if a developer 
has won preferred bidder status he has the power to negotiate more favourable terms--whereas the EPC has to 
ensure proper pricing in order to be successful with a winning project. 
Q7R7 It is common place for a developer to continue negotiations with more than one EPC and Lender to close to 
Financial Close, in order to be able to negotiate a competitive contract. 
Q7R8 This will increase competition and the volume of bidders which might reduce costs. 
The DOE then run the risk of projects not getting to FC because of EPC and Lenders not being able to 
participate in the projects as it may not be bankable. 
The DOE will therefore incur the costs in reviewing and awarding projects that is not bankable. 
I agree that more time will assist the developers in further refining their offering, however developers and the 
market matured in a manner that the marginal improvement may not be that significant. 
Q7R9 This is a double edged sword as you noted in your questions, however the freedom of not being locked to a 
specific EPC does allow for better terms to be reached. From experience once you are locked in and the EPC 
knows this they inflate their prices, if there is still competition to the end then the developer can leverage this 
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for a better price and ultimately can allow for better tariffs (should the Bidder take the risk to bid lower). This 
being said, it does have the distinct risk that in the future a bidder would not be able to close their projects due 
to "low ball" pricing and non-competitive EPC agreements after PB. 
Q7R10 The change was for the better as allowed projects to adapt to the market changes or varying costs. Projects that 
were bound to EPC's and Lenders were not able to negotiate post submission even when the market had 
changed significantly. Unforeseen costs such as 200% cost estimate to Budget Quotes increases, were passed 
onto the project which had little to no negotiation angles to mitigate the impacts and in some cases affected 
the viability to the point of collapse. 
Q7R11 This was a welcome change as such terms should only be finalized after the projects have been awarded so as 
to save time, costs and improve terms. 
Q7R12 I think that this was an understandable development from a bidding perspective, as the costs of submitting 
fully underwritten bids from Lenders and EPC Contractors became more and more expensive. However, i 
think it was a dangerous development as it left all of the key negotiations with Lenders, EPC Contractors and 
O&M Contractors to the period after the announcement of preferred bidders when the electricity tariffs had be 
“locked in” by the DoE. I don’t think that this change enabled developers to agree better terms with both 
lenders and EPCs post the announcement of the preferred bidders for the respective REIPPPP bidding rounds. 
 
Q8 Given the rules and requirements of the REIPPP programme and / or the SPIPPs programme what are 
the non-government or Eskom related key factors that determine whether a project will be delivered 
successfully? 
Q8R1 The cost factor associated with the interconnection point. 
Q8R2 Eskom is imposing high risks on the projects with very onerous and unnecessary costly grid compliance 
requirements and an uncertain grid connection approval process. 
Q8R3 Experience and qualification of key counter parties i.e. EPC who has experience in RSA REIPPPP and 
shareholders with technical experience and knowledge (not just financial investors). 
Q8R4 No comment. 
Q8R5 Factors to be considered would be : 
* compliance with the RFP 
* equity and debt funding commitments from reputable third party lenders and equity funding from parties 
with strong financial balance sheets 
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* legally binding EPC , O & M, land and servitude agreements, management services agreements 
* robust financial model underpinning the project 
* grant of all the necessary permits, licenses and authorizations required by the Project 
*  market reputation of all shareholders, third party contractors and lenders 
* value for money proposition and sufficient risk transfer per PPP principles 
Q8R6 Eskom's willingness to provide a budget quote and grid connection at a price not too far removed from the 
price indicated in the Cost Estimate Letter. Also, I believe that EPC capability is key--to know where the 
unknowns are and adequately allowing for every eventuality, whilst keeping overall costs to a minimum. 
Q8R7 Whether Eskom will execute the PPA and facilitate grid integration. 
Q8R8 Non-government: effective value chain development for the procurement of project material and services. 
Eskom: Grid code compliance and related costs. 
Q8R9 Timeous responses and work by Eskom is a key risk, the grid connection is the responsibility (ultimately) of 
Eskom and should they lag or delay (which is mostly the case) this can cause severe strain on the project 
timelines. 
Q8R10 A strong and experienced development team which includes consultants and advisors who are able to adapt to 
evolving requirements without burdening the project with unforeseen fees. A transparent and trusting project 
partnership where the members have clear roles aligned with their strengths and trusted to fulfil that role 
appropriately. An EPC who understands all the project dynamics, especially from an owner’s perspective, and 
optimizes their margins to obtain the lowest LCOE whilst not affecting long term profitability. 
Q8R11 These outside factors have a minimal impact on the projects. Eskom is directly linked to the programme and 
should simply adhere to the rules stipulated for it role to ensure that projects are delivered successfully. 
Q8R12 The availability, timings and costings of budget quotes from Eskom have proven to be key success factors for 
competing REIPPPP bidders. Similarly, the availability of grid connections and the existing loadings on the 
transmission network in different parts of South Africa have been another key determinant of tendering 
success. 
 
Q9 Are there areas where the South African renewable energy industry (finance, legal, consultants, 
contracts, other?) could improve in order to reduce the time and cost of project delivery further? 
Q9R1 The market became efficient very quickly, so not any more. 
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Q9R2 Legal and banking is still inefficient. We should get the same result for less cost. 
Q9R3 Standardized legal agreements. 
Q9R4 No comment 
Q9R5 Unwavering political will and leadership to REIPPP to ensure commitment and adherence to timelines, 
alignment of all inter -dependent government departments and SOEs to REIPPP and their respective roles, 
regulate and consistent communication with the market. Alignment of all legislation and flow through of tax 
benefits in respect of rehabilitation obligations as seen in the mining industry as well the grant of Sec 53 
permits under the MPRD. Impact of localization requirements on the tariffs - is South African based industry 
sufficiently competitive with global market especially with PV panels and converters. Regard to be had to 
global developments and enhanced features of other global Programmes which could be used in REIPPP. Use 
of previously banked documentation ( finance, construction, operation and maintenance) that has been signed 
off by lender credit committees so as not to re-invent the wheel 
Q9R6 Legal advisors could make better use of technical consultants earlier in the process to ensure no comebacks 
later regarding contractual and performance matters. 
Q9R7 More policy certainty and government support is required for the industry to continue delivering projects. 
Q9R8 There is always room for innovation and improvement across each sub-sector that will result in overall 
improvement. 
Q9R9 Ultimately an increase in allocation (up from 140MW and 75MW) would reduce pricing as a whole, but more 
favourable lending rates would be essential, contractors are currently already under pressure to do both Local 
content and lower prices, reduction in Consultant would save on price as currently there is no synergy between 
DD parties and this is causing both time and cost delays to some projects. 
Q9R10 Legal fees represent one of the biggest costs for projects and often appear to go to unnecessary levels without 
the projects best interest in context. Standardized project agreements could assist in reducing this expense 
however this approach has yet to yield benefits. Environmental legislation and authority decisions are 
becoming increasingly unpredictable and have resulted in large amount of projects and resources fail at the 
11th hour, often based on questionable decisions. Recourse for the project is a double edged sword as 
challenging the authorities puts risk on the relationship and future projects which the developers business is 
reliant on. 
Q9R11 Costs need to be reduced across all facets to match the reduction in tariffs and the level of returns that are 
required to make the projects successful. 
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Q9R12 I think that there needs to be much tighter programme management of the REIPPP programme from the DoE 
/ IPP Office so that EPC bid validity periods and EPC pricings and conditions are not compromised for 
developers, and that the interest rate yield curve does not move out (increase) beyond the developers pricing 
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FIGURE 7: SOUTH AFRICAN PPP PROJECTS CIMO 
